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Abstract
Auction mechanisms are viewed as an efficient approach for resource allocation and
different types of auctions have been designed to allocate spectrum, determine positions
for advertisements on web pages, and sell products on the Internet, among others.
Online auctions can be implemented as an intermediary for both sellers and buyers in
agent-mediated e-commerce systems. This raises two concerns. Firstly, the automation
of online auction trading requires buyer agents to understand the auction protocol and
have the ability to communicate with the seller agents (i.e., the auctioneer). Secondly,
buyer agents need to automatically check desirable properties that are central to their
decision making.
To address both concerns, we have proposed a certification framework to enable soft-
ware agents automatically verify some desirable properties of a specific auction through
a formally designed communication protocol, and then make decisions according to
the result of the communication. Furthermore, we have extended the communication
mechanism to the area of Semantic Web Service composition and have explored the
verification of combinatorial auction mechanisms.
To demonstrate our approach, we have modelled online auctions as web services
and have applied the technique of Semantic Web Service to represent auction protocols.
Then we rely on computer-aided verification techniques to construct and check formal
proofs of desirable properties for specific auctions. Finally, dialogue games are proposed
to enable decision making and service compositions for software agents.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In the last few decades, electronic commerce (e-commerce) has rapidly developed and
widely spread which leads to faster and more efficient business process. E-commerce
systems are viewed as tools for efficient allocation of resources and automated elec-
tronic transactions. Multi-agent systems consist of autonomous software components
which have been introduced into e-commerce systems for the automation of electronic
transactions. With the growth of online transactions, there has been an increased de-
mand to develop advanced techniques to enhance agent-mediated e-commerce systems.
In these systems, software agents (both seller and buyer agents) are designed and de-
veloped by different organizations to automatically accomplish their tasks on behalf of
their owners. The automation of online transaction causes a variety of challenges. For
example, one challenge is that agents automatically make their decisions without cen-
tralized control and they are constrained with limited computational resources. This
implies that the trading mechanism of each e-commerce system should be represented
in a machine-understandable way, and those agents should make decisions on the basis
of the trading mechanism to maximize their payoffs. As a consequence, software agents
should be self-interested which means that they attempt to gain the maximum profit
for their owners. However, the behaviour of an agent may cause detrimental outcomes
for its owner. To avoid losing profit, buyer agents should ensure that some desirable
properties are held in the system. For instance, software agents may want to guarantee
that they will not lose profit caused by fictitious bids in an auction. Another challenge
is the lack of efficient communication protocol between agents. On one hand, redundant
or unnecessary communication can increase instability and chaos into the system. On
the other hand, well designed communication protocol can enhance coordination among
agents. This thesis illustrates the research that has been conducted to address some of
the challenges within agent-mediated e-commerce systems. We propose a certification
framework that relies on techniques of communication and verification. In this thesis,
certification is the procedure by which an agency assesses and verifies characteristics
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of a system according to its requirements specification. Verification is the process of
checking whether a specification satisfies certain properties. We are concerned with the
formal verification that relies on formal methods which model systems as mathemat-
ical entities, so that software agents do not need to manually check the paper proofs.
This research will benefit small and medium enterprises that develop software agents
to carry out online trading. It also can inspire the research of designing and verifying
new auction mechanisms in online settings.
1.2 Problem Statement
To enable buyer agents1 to automatically verify desirable properties of a trading pro-
tocol and communicate with the service provider2, we need to determine the following
requirements.
1. Representation of trading mechanisms. In an agent mediated e-commerce system,
the trading protocol should be represented in a machine understandable way, so
that agents can read and interpret the meaning of the protocols. For example,
the inputs of a system indicate the data should be provided to start a trading.
2. Proof of desirable properties. We need to use a language that is expressive enough
to describe desirable properties of a trading mechanism and provide formal proofs
of these properties, so that buyer agents can ensure these desirable properties of
the trading mechanism.
3. Automated verification of desirable properties. Given the proofs of desirable prop-
erties, we need to enable buyers to verify the correctness of the proof. Thus the
trustworthiness between buyer agents and seller agents can be promoted.
4. Automated communication between agents. The exchange of information between
buyers and sellers requires the design of automated interaction protocol. The
interaction between agents should not be limited to a client-server communication
mode. The interaction protocol should support different types of communication.
For instance, one participant can influence another to accept a proposition.
5. Automated service composition. As online transaction may require the combina-
tion of several services, automated service composition should be implemented to
fulfill the requirements of agents.
1In this thesis, buyer agents are the same as the service consumers.
2In this thesis, service providers are the same as the seller agents.
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1.3 Solution Outline
In this thesis, we focus on auctions which are important e-commerce protocols that
have been used to buy and sell goods. Auctions are designed to have certain desirable
properties, such as incentive compatibility which encourages agents to bid truthfully,
or efficient [31] which maximizes the surplus. We focus on models of rationality by
equilibrium concepts are well studied in game theory mechanism design. For example,
dominant strategy equilibrium can be used to achieve incentive compatibility.
Online trading mechanisms can be represented as Web services. Semantic Web Ser-
vices (SWS) [76] combine the technique of Web Services and Semantic Web [15]. Web
Services enable automated discovery, selection, composition and execution of services
while Semantic Web allows machine to interpret the meaning of ontologies. Therefore,
we rely on SWS to describe the trading protocols to fulfill the first requirement of
“Representation of trading mechanisms”. By using ontology, SWS provide a shared
knowledge base which defines the same interpretation of terms and operations for all
participants. Thus SWS can be treated as a solution to represent trading mechanisms in
heterogeneous environments where self-interested agents are designed and implemented.
Although SWS has the ability to represent the description of trading mechanisms,
the expressiveness and reasoning abilities of SWS languages are limited. Inspired by
the work of Tadjouddine et al. [97, 98] where model checking has been used to check the
strategy-proofness property of an auction. We have applied logic-based languages to
model and reason about systems to satisfy the second requirement of “Proof of desirable
properties”. Logic-based languages allow us to specify requirements of a system and for-
mulate desirable properties for the system. Besides, we have adopted the Foundational
Proof-Carrying Code (FPCC) [2] paradigm to enable software agents to automatically
check the properties (such as safety) of the system to accomplish the third requirement
of “Automated verification of desirable properties”. As we have defined the specifica-
tion of a trading mechanism using SWS, we need to translate the original specification
to the logical based program. In the work of Caminati et al. [23, 24], they have explored
the feasibility of applying formal proofs to verify properties of mechanisms. For exam-
ple, they prove that allocations of a mechanism are pairwise disjoint, and prices are
non-negative. Lapets et al. [60] have presented a typed language to define allocation
algorithms for auctions. The property of truthfulness of the algorithm is automatically
verified by analyzing the definition and keeping track of desirable characteristics. In
our study, we have verified mechanisms that are written in ontology languages. This
requires us to translate the ontology of a mechanism to a program that is expressed
within a theorem prover.
In addition, we use dialogue games to support the communication between buyer
agents and seller agents to satisfy the fourth requirement of “Automated communication
between agents”. In a dialogue game the seller provides Web services, and the buyer
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agent allowed asking desirable questions to the seller. In our work, an inquiry dialogue
game is designed as a bipartite communication protocol. In this protocol, buyer agents
can query questions to the seller and then make judgments according to the result of
a dialogue. Furthermore, we integrated the FPCC paradigm within the dialogue game
so that buyers can check whether some desirable properties are held in a system. This
design has been implemented in the agent development platform JADE [11]. Seller
agents (i.e., auctioneers) and buyer agents are different components in the platform
and they are integrated in a loosely coupled manner. To fulfill the fifth requirement of
“Automated service composition”, we propose dialogue service automata to integrate
dialogue games to composite Semantic Web Services. The advantage of using automata
based model is that the behaviors of services can be described as a sequence of states
and the transitions of states can be associated with messages or activities [95].
1.4 Contributions
The main focus of this thesis is to enable software agents capable of automatically verify
desirable properties of auction mechanisms. Furthermore, to make agents automatically
carry out service inquiry and service composition in the setting of agent-mediated e-
commerce systems. More specifically, this thesis addresses the research problems in
Section 1.2 and provides the following contributions:
• The development of ontologies of Web services for online auctions. We have
used OWL Web Ontology Language for Services (OWL-S) to describe single item
English auction service in Section 4.1.2 and other related services such as payment
and delivery in Section 6.2.2.
• We have translated the OWL-S specification into a program written using an
imperative language within the interactive theorem prover Coq. The proofs of
desirable properties such as dominant strategy have been developed based on
Hoare Logic is covered in Chapter 4.
• We have implemented the FPCC paradigm to enable auctioneers (service providers)
to publish the above proofs, then buyers (service consumers) to download these
proofs combine with the specification. Therefore, buyers can automatically check
the correctness of the proofs using the Coq proof checker [9].
• We have proposed an inquiry dialogue model [6] to enable buyer agents to auto-
matically ask desirable questions to the auctioneer. These questions could relate
to information such as QoS or properties which have formal proofs. Buyers can
make decisions according to the result of the answer.
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• We have developed information-seeking dialogue and persuasion dialogue to pass
information during the process of a service and enable service composition in an
online trading scenario which explained in Chapter 6.
• We have explored the verification of desirable properties for combinatorial auc-
tions at the end of the thesis. As the expressiveness limitation of SWS languages,
we have used Coq to formalize and prove desirable properties of a VCG auction
which detailed in Chapter 7.
These contributions have led to a number of peer-reviewed publications:
1. Bai W, Tadjouddine E, Payne T. A Dialectical Approach to Enable Decision
Making in Online Trading[M]//Multi-Agent Systems and Agreement Technolo-
gies. Springer International Publishing, 2015: 203-218.
2. Bai, W., Tadjouddine, E.M.: Automated program translation in certifying online
auctions. In: ETAPS/VPT 2015, 11-18 April, London, UK (2015).
3. Bai W, Tadjouddine E, Payne T. Dialogue Driven Semantic Web Services. Yue,
Y., Ariwa, E., IEEE International Conference on Computing and Technology
Innovation (CTI 2015), 27-28 May, Luton, United Kingdom, 2015.
4. Bai, W., E. M. Tadjouddine, and Y. Guo (2014). Enabling Automatic Certifica-
tion of Online Auctions. In: Proceedings 11th International Workshop on For-
mal Engineering Approaches to Software Components and Architectures.(EPTCS
147, Apr. 2, 2014). Ed. by J. K. B. Buhnova L. Happe, pp. 123-132. doi:
10.4204/EPTCS.147.9.
5. Bai W, Tadjouddine E M, Payne T R, et al. A proof-carrying code approach
to certificate auction mechanisms[M]//Formal Aspects of Component Software.
Springer International Publishing, 2013: 23-40.
1.5 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 provides the literature that is related to agent-mediated e-commerce sys-
tems, including Multi-agent systems, Semantic Web, program verification, and agent
communication techniques.
Chapter 3 studies a pilot example that verifies some desirable properties of a single
item Vickrey auction, and then proposes a certification framework based on Semantic
Web Service, FPCC and dialogue games.
Chapter 4 presents a specification of an online auction in a Semantic Web Service
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language OWL-S, and then describes the translation of this specification from OWL-S
to an imperative program that is defined within Coq. Some desirable properties of
this auction have been stated and proved at the end of this chapter.
Chapter 5 proposes a dialogue game that integrates with FPCC paradigm to en-
able information inquiry and decision making in online auction services.
Chapter 6 introduces a dialogue driven approach to composite Semantic Web Services.
Chapter 7 provides the formalization and verification of desirable properties of com-
binatorial VCG auctions.
Chapter 8 summarizes the thesis and discusses the future research directions of this
work.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter provides an overview of the techniques and methodology that are relevant
to the research topic of this thesis.
The organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 2.1 introduces the basic model
of multi-agent systems, the knowledge of games and auctions which can be treated as a
type of games. Section 2.2 shows the concept of Semantic Web and its application. Sec-
tion 2.3 presents the introduction to the technique of program verification. Section 2.4
describes background knowledge of agent communication.
2.1 Distributed Computing/Artificial Intelligence
The network has linked billions of computers worldwide, which enables computers to
interact and collaborate with each other and to share resources among the system. This
leads to the development of distributed system that integrates multiple autonomous
components to communicate with each other by message passing. Besides, a branch of
artificial intelligence (AI) is centered on the concept of a rational agent. An agent is a
computer program that is situated in some environment and is capable of autonomous
actions to meet its design objectives [114]. An agent is called rational when it is
consistently tries to optimize its performance. As the development of AI, more and
more tasks are delegated to computers, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, cleaning
robots, and self-driving cars. These trends have led to the development of multi-agent
systems.
2.1.1 Multi-agent Systems
An agent is a computer system that can automatically carry out actions on behalf
of its owner to achieve design objectives. A single intelligent agent has four types of
properties [115]:
• Autonomy : this indicates how independently agents operate and control over
their initial state and actions.
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• Reactivity : agents should be able to perceive their environment, and respond to
changes in a short time.
• Pro-activeness: agents should be able to generate and attempt to achieve goals,
rather than simply act in response of external events.
• Social ability : agents have the ability to interact with each other to meet the
social characteristics of cooperation, coordination, and negotiation.
In a multi-agent system, multiple intelligent agents cooperate, coordinate, and negotiate
with each other to achieve their objectives in a common environment. Cooperation
means agents work with others when a goal cannot be achieved by a single agent or
it will gain better results. Coordination represents the problem of managing inter-
dependencies between activities of agents. Negotiation is used when agents need to
reach agreements on matters of mutual interest.
The realization of multi-agent systems requires the development of programming
languages and tools. JADE [12] is one platform that has been designed to develop multi-
agent applications in compliance with the FIPA specifications [38]. Our framework is
implemented using JADE. JADE is a distributed middleware system that is written in
Java, and it allows easily extended by users. JADE includes three core components [12]:
• a runtime environment where agents can be activated and executed;
• a library that can be used by programmer to develop agents;
• graphical tools that can be used to administrate and monitor agents’ activities.
One running instance of the JADE runtime environment is called a Container, and
each container can contain several agents. Agents are distinct from one another with
unique names. A collection of active containers is called a Platform. A very first
container is a single Main Container which starts a platform. Other containers
in the same platform follow the main container and they must register to the main
container as soon as they start. The difference between a main container and other
normal containers is the main container includes two special components which are not
in the normal containers. They are AMS (Agent Management System) which has the
authority to perform management actions and DF (Directory Facilitator) which allows
agents to publish and find services.
JADE agents carry out actual jobs by implementing Behaviour objects which
are used to specify the actions of agents. JADE provides two main classes to repre-
sent primitive and composite behaviours respectively. The components of these two
behaviours are as follows:
• Primitive Behaviours
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– OneShotBehaviour models atomic behaviours only be executed once.
– CyclicBehaviour models atomic behaviours that are executed as long as
an agent is alive.
– TickerBehaviour models atomic behaviours that are executed periodically.
– WakerBehaviour models atomic behaviours only execute after a particular
time elapse.
• Composite Behaviours
– SequentialBehaviour models behaviours that execute its children behaviours
one by one until the final behaviour has ended.
– ParallelBehaviour models behaviours that execute its children behaviours
concurrently until reach the termination condition.
– FSMBehaviour models behaviours that execute its children behaviours on
the basis of a Finite State Machine.
2.1.2 Game Theory and Auctions
Game theory is the formal study of decision-making among intelligent rational agents
applied in economics, political science and computer science, etc. In game theory,
there are two premises: one is that all participating agents are rational; the other is
that agents take into account other agents’ decisions in their decision making. In this
thesis, we concentrate on noncooperative game theory where the basic modeling unit
is the individual [90]. Games can be represented in normal form, or strategic form,
where all players choose their strategies simultaneously. The normal form uses a triple
to define a game: a set of players N = {1, ..., n}, a set of strategies Si that are available
to player i, where i ∈ N , and a utility function ui(Si, S−i), which describes the utility
of player i if it uses strategy Si and other players use strategies S−i. Extensive form
games model the sequential decision making of agents, and they can be represented by
game trees.
A noncooperative game can be illustrated by the prisoner’s dilemma example. As-
sume that there are two prisoners R and C. They are interviewed separately so that
they cannot communicate with each other. Each of them has two strategies, called
“Confess” and “Deny”. They aim to minimize the year of imprisonment. Table 2.1
shows the payoff of this game. If both of them choose “Deny”, they will both serve 2
years in prison. If one of them chooses “Confess”, the confessor will serve 1 year and
the other will serve 5 years. If both of them choose “Confess”, both of them will serve
3 years. Under the setting of noncooperation, each prisoner is interested in their own
payoff. If prisoner R chooses “Confess”, the better response of prisoner C is “Confess”.
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C
Confess Deny
Confess 3, 3 1, 5
Deny 5, 1 2, 2
Table 2.1: Prisoner’s dilemma
If prisoner R changed to choose “Deny”, the better choice for prisoner C is still “Con-
fess”. The case of prisoner R is symmetric. According to this reasoning, both of them
will choose “Confess”. In the game of prisoner’s dilemma, “Confess” is a dominant
strategy for each player to yield the best payoff.
An auction can be modeled as a noncooperative game where bidders can have
conflict of interests. Auctions have been exploited as a testing-ground for game theory
with incomplete information. Besides, a huge volume of goods has been sold through
auctions, and new auction mechanisms have been designed to sell different kinds of
products, such as the “Generalized Second Price Auction” which is used by Google to
sell Google Ads advertisement slots.
Auctions are composed of rules that describe the mechanisms of winner determina-
tions and payments. Four basic types of auctions for single item are widely used.
• English auctions, also called Ascending-bid auctions. In this auction format, a
single item is offered for sale interactively in real time. One auction starts from
a lowest bidding amount, and the seller gradually raises the price until only one
bidder remains. The last bidder wins and pays the last bidding amount. The
seller can set a reserve price for the item. If all the bids are less than the reserve
price, then this item is not sold. In other forms of English auctions, bidders can
shout out bids or submit them through the network.
• Dutch auctions, also called Descending-bid auctions. These auctions are also
interactive auctions in which the seller gradually decreases the price of the item
from a highest bidding amount. A Dutch auction ends when the first moment
a bidder accepts the offered bidding price. The payment of the winner is the
accepted price. These types of auctions are exhaustively used by flower merchant
in the Netherlands.
• First-price sealed-bid auctions. These are auctions in which bidders simultane-
ously submit their sealed bids to the seller, so that a bidder only knows his own
information. The bidder with the highest bid wins and the payment is the highest
bid.
• Vickrey auctions, also called Second-price sealed-bid auctions. In this kind of
auction, all bidders simultaneously submit their sealed bids to the seller. The
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winner is the bidder who has quoted the highest amount, but the winner only
pays the second highest quoted amount.
In an English auction, the dominant strategy for a bidder is rise from the reserve
price, and then dropout when the actual bidding amount is equal to its valuation. For
a Vickrey auction, the dominant strategy for each bidder is bid its valuation, which is
also called incentive compatible. An extended Vickrey auction that also satisfied the
property of incentive compatibility is called Vickrey-Clarke-Groves or VCG. A VCG
auction is a combinatorial auction in which bidders can place bids on combinations of
items. It is performed by finding the allocation that maximizes the social welfare and
the payment rule gives discount to each winner on the basis of his contribution to the
overall value for the auction.
2.2 Semantic Web
Normal Web is designed for application to human interactions. Semantic Web [15]
extends the normal Web by providing machine-readable data for computers. Semantic
Web techniques enable people to create and publish data on the Web in a machine
interpretable format so that computers can automatically query and reason on these
data. To achieve the goal of Semantic Web, meta-data are used to express the meaning
of data and can be exchanged among computers. The World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C) promotes the so-called “Semantic Layer Cake” framework for the development
of meta-data in Semantic Web.
2.2.1 Semantic Web Layer Cake
Semantic Web techniques are composed of markup languages, which are designed to
annotate documents or web pages, with a formal syntax and semantics. These lan-
guages are used to describe data in a standard concept and form the Semantic Web
hierarchy [93]. Figure 2.1 shows the hierarchy of the Semantic Web.
Identifiers: URI Character Set: UNICODE 
Syntax: XML 
Data interchange: RDF 
Taxonomies: RDFS 
Rules: RIF/SWRL Ontologies: OWL Querying: 
APARQL 
Unifying Logic 
Proof 
Trust 
C
ryp
to
grap
h
y 
User interface and applications 
Figure 2.1: Semantic Web Stack
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The bottom layer contains Unicode and Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI). Uni-
code is a character encoding system that provides a unique number for every character.
URIs are short strings that identify resources in the web that provide unique and unam-
biguous names for resources. The second layer is XML (eXtensible Markup Language)
which can be used to define the structure of data by adding tags. XML provides a
way to define the syntax of data, while the semantics of data cannot be expressed.
RDF (Resource Description Framework) provides an approach to describe resources
via meta-data. All the statements in RDF are expressed as triples (subject, predicate,
and object). RDF-S (RDF Schema) is an extension of RDF which allows describing
the taxonomies of classes and properties.
The OWL Web Ontology Language is a standard W3C Recommendation ontology
language. The term ontology represents the kinds of entities and their relations in the
world. OWL provides more vocabulary to describe classes and properties than RDF-
S. OWL is a Description Logic based ontology language and the details of Description
Logic can be found in [56]. OWL provides set operations (e.g. union, intersection, com-
plement), universal and existential quantifications, cardinality constraints, etc. Given
an OWL ontology, its logical consequences can be entailed on the basis of the OWL
formal semantics. W3C provides standardize OWL [75] in 2004 and its successor OWL
2 [78] in 2009. OWL provides three sub-languages based on their expressiveness and
computational complexity:
• OWL DL is a Description Logic based language with RDF syntax. It is computa-
tional complete which means that all conclusions are guaranteed to be computable
and decidable which means that all computations will finish in finite time.
• OWL Lite is a subset of OWL DL, a good choice for users to describe classifi-
cation hierarchy and simple constraint features.
• OWL Full combines OWL DL and RDF. Compared to OWL DL, OWL Full is
undecidable.
OWL 2 extends OWL by adding more functionality, such as property chains, qual-
ified cardinality restrictions, and enhanced annotation capabilities, etc. OWL 2 has
different variants.
• OWL 2 Full is an extension of RDFS, a very expressive language and it is fully
upward-compatible with RDF. However, OWL 2 Full is not decidable.
• OWL 2 Lite is a syntactically restriction version of OWL 2 Full and it offers
reasonably efficient reasoning support.
• OWL 2 QL, OWL 2 EL, OWL 2 RL are three subsets of OWL 2. They are
designed to guarantee scalable reasoning for different application scenarios.
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SWRL (Semantic Web Rule Language) [50] is a rule language that extends OWL to
provide more powerful deductive reasoning capabilities. SWRL is represented as an
implication between an antecedent and consequent. One of the powerful functionalities
of SWRL is that it provides the built-ins for comparisons and arithmetic operations.
Both SWRL and OWL obey the assumption of Open World Assumption where ab-
sence of information is interpreted as unknown information. RIF (Rule Interchange
Format) [53] is another W3C Recommendation rule language. SPARQL [45] is a query
language for RDF and it provides a standard format and a set of rules for writing and
processing queries. The above three layers which concern complex logics and proofs to
establish trustworthiness is still an ongoing research topic in the area of Semantic Web.
2.2.2 Semantic Web Services
Web services provide support for inter-operable machine-to-machine interaction over
networks. There are three major roles in Web services: the first one is the service
provider that provides the implementation of a particular Web service, the second is
the service requester that wishes to make use of a provider’s Web service, and the third
is the service registry that registers Web services. Web Services are built by using
different standard technologies. The exchanging messages are encoded in XML format
so that information can be interpreted by computers. SOAP (Simple Object Access
Protocol) is a standard messaging protocol for packaging and exchanging XML messages
and SOAP messages can be carried by variety of network protocols. The Web Service
Description Language (WSDL) is a language that used to define the public interface
of Web services. WSDL describes the operations of a specific Web service, the data
format to access the Web service, and the location of the Web service. Another protocol
UDDI (Universal Description, Discovery and Integration) is used to publish and locate
services in a repository.
Web Services provide standards to ensure interoperability across diverse platforms.
However, it is not sufficient for software agents to automatically use Web services. To
integrate Web Services with multi-agent systems, agents need to contain and reason
about the semantics of the Web Services. The technique of Semantic Web inspires the
development of Semantic Web Services (SWS). SWS address the challenge of automat-
ically discovery, composition and execution of Web services that involved in intelligent
software agents. OWL-S (Web Ontology Language for Services) is an ontology language
that is proposed to represent an upper ontology for the description of Semantic Web
Services expressed in OWL. OWL-S contains three interrelated parts: ServiceProfile
describes what the service does; ServiceModel describes how the service is used; and
ServiceGrounding describes how to interact with the service.
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2.3 Program Verification
Program verification is a research area that studies formal methods for checking a
software program conforms to its specification. It concerns properties of codes, which
can be studied in many different methods such as logic, model checking and abstract
interpretation. In our work, we use the logic-based methods to verify the properties of
a specification.
2.3.1 Program Specification
A specification describes the desired behaviors of a program. There are three branches
in formal methods to describe a specification of a system. The first one is the model-
based specification which describes the internal states and the transition of states of
a system. The second is the algebraic approach that specifies a system in terms of
its operations and their relationships. The last is the declarative specifications which
describe systems using logic-based languages, functional languages and rewriting lan-
guages, etc. In our work, we use the declarative approach to describe the specification
of programs.
2.3.2 Hoare Logic
Hoare Logic [48] is introduced by C.A.R. Hoare in 1969 to reason about the correctness
of imperative programs. In our work, we used Hoare Logic to verify the desirable
properties of While programs which are written in a simple imperative language. The
specification of a While program consists of a precondition and a postcondition. The
inference system of Hoare Logic is used to construct a derivation to determine the
correctness of the specification. The imperative language includes a skip command,
assignment, sequential composition, if-then-else branches and a while loop.
In this work, we consider a WHILE-language composed of assignments, if, and
while statements, and in which expressions are formed using basic arithmetic or logical
operations. We denote V, a set of program variables that are integer or Boolean, E
the set of arithmetic expressions, B the set of Boolean expressions, and C the set of
commands or statements. This language can be described as:
x ∈ V
aop ∈ {+,−,×, /}
rop ∈ {<,>,==,≤, . . .}
lop ∈ {∧,∨,¬, . . .}
E 3 e ::= const | x | e aop e
B 3 b ::= true | false | e rop e | b lop b
C 3 c ::= skip | x := e | c; c | if b then c else c | while b do c
The states σ ∈ S = V → Z are defined as associations of values to variables, and
the evaluation of expressions remains standard in the natural (or big-step) semantics,
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see for example [61]. We denote σ  C  σ′ to mean a command c evaluated in a
pre-state σ leads to a post-state σ′. This allows us to reason on the program by using
Hoare Logic.
(|ψ[E/x]|)x = E(|ψ|) Assignment
(|φ|)C1(|η|) (|η|)C2(|ψ|)
(|φ|)C1;C2(|ψ|)
Composition
(|φ ∧B|)C1(|ψ|) (|φ ∧ ¬B|)C2(|ψ|)
(|φ|)if B {C1} else {C2}(|ψ|)
If-statement
(|ψ ∧B|)C(|ψ|)
(|ψ|)whileB {C}(|ψ ∧ ¬B|) Partial-while
` φ′ → φ (|φ|)C(|ψ|) ` ψ → ψ′
(
∣∣φ′∣∣)C(∣∣ψ′∣∣) Implied
Figure 2.2: Proof rules for partial correctness of Hoare triples.
Hoare logic is a sound and complete formal system providing logical rules for rea-
soning about the correctness of computer programs. For a given statement S, the Hoare
triple {φ}S{ψ} means the execution of S in a state satisfying the pre-condition φ will
be in a state satisfying the post-condition ψ when it terminates. The conditions φ and
ψ are first order logical formulae called assertions. Hoare proofs are compositional in
the structure of the language in which the program is written. A judgment ` {φ}S{ψ}
is valid if the triple {φ}S{ψ} can be proven in the Hoare calculus. The proof rules for
partial correctness of Hoare triples are given in Figure 2.2. Partial correctness does
not require the program to terminate, whereas total correctness requires the program
terminates [51].
2.3.3 Proof-Carrying Code
Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [79] is a technique used by a host computer system (the
code consumer) to automatically verify the safety properties of code that are provided
by untrusted agents (the code producer). PCC can be used in the environment of
distributed computing where mobile code is allowed. In this environment the code
producer on one side of the network produces a software program that is transmitted
to the code consumer on another side for execution. The code consumer can apply PCC
to verify that the code behaves correctly and satisfied a set of safety rules. The first
step of PCC is that the code consumer specified the safety policy which describes the
conditions for safe behavior of foreign program. Then the code producer generates a
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proof that the program adheres to the safety policy. This process is called certification
which is a form of verification with respect to the program specification. At last, the
code consumer uses a proof checker to check the validity of the program. If the proof is
valid, the code consumer will trust that the program is safe to execute. In the original
PCC framework, proofs are written in a logic extended with language-specific typing
rules which assumes that there is no bug in the typing rules. In the work of Appel [2],
Foundational Proof-Carrying Code (FPCC) has been proposed to use a foundational
mathematical logic to define the semantics of instructions and proof rules. In our work,
we use the Coq proof assistant which is a tool for the calculus of inductive construction
to implement the FPCC framework.
2.3.4 An Interactive Theorem Prover Coq
We have applied an interactive theorem prover Coq1, which is based on a logical frame-
work known as the Calculus of Inductive Construction, to formalize auction mechanisms
and prove interested properties. Coq allows users to define functions or predicates, to
state mathematical theorems and develop interactively formal proofs of theorems, to
describe software specifications and develop proofs for desirable properties of the spec-
ification. Besides, Coq contains a small certification “kernel” to check the correctness
of formal proofs.
Coq uses a specification language which is named Gallina to describe declarations
and definitions. Gallina can be used to represent programs as well as properties of
these programs. Coq also provides a proof engine to build proofs using tactics, which
are commands that are used to build proofs. In Coq, logical propositions are called
Prop, mathematical collections are called Set, and abstract types are named with Type.
Coq is also a functional programming language which offers a powerful mechanism
for defining new data types and writing programs. Inductive definitions can be used to
define data types and their members. For example, the basic data type boolean can be
defined as the following declaration bool. This definition shows that the type bool of
boolean has members true and false.
Inductive bool : Type :=
| true : bool
| false : bool.
Definitions in Coq can be used to define non-recursive functions. The function and
represents the ∧ operation of two boolean variables. In this definition, pattern-matching
is used over the term b1 to compare it with different branches.
Definition and (b1:bool)(b2:bool) : bool :=
1http://coq.inria.fr
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match b1 with
| true => b2
| false => false
end.
Recursive functions are defined using the command Fixpoint. For example, the
function beq nat is defined to determine the equivalence of two natural numbers.
Fixpoint beq_nat (n m : nat) : bool :=
match n with
| O => match m with
| O => true
| S m’ => false
end
| S n’ => match m with
| O => false
| S m’ => beq_nat n’ m’
end
end.
In Coq, an assertion states a proposition of which the proof is interactively built
using tactics. The basic assertion commands for a theorem and a lemma are:
Lemma ident : type
and
Theorem ident : type.
Table 2.2: Most Common Tactics
Tactic Effect
intro. Introduce one assumption
intros. Introduce as many assumptions as possible
apply H. Applies assumption H
induction t. Perform induction proof over term t
rewrite H. Rewrite assumption H
destruct t. Perform case analysis without recursion
omega. An automatic decision procedure for
Presburger arithmetic
After a statement has asserted, Coq needs a proof to validate the statement. A
tactic language which is called Ltac is used to code procedures of proofs in Coq. Ltac
offers a wide variety of tactics to build proofs of statements, including unfold definitions,
check equality, etc. The proof development inCoq is based on a goal-oriented approach.
The system keeps track of the current goal and the set of premises. Then, users insert
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tactics to adjust the proof state. The proof finishes when we match a state with the
conclusion. Table 2.2 illustrates some common used tactics in a proof.
In our work, we have used Coq as a proof assistant for higher order logic to formalize
and validate the properties of Vickrey and Combinatorial auctions, as a platform to
model imperative languages, and as a logical framework to develop the reasoning system
of Hoare Logic.
2.4 Agent Communication
One of the key properties of multi-agent systems is interoperability which requires
agents to communicate with each other to fulfill their goals. The communication mech-
anism among agents contains three aspects: the Syntax which shows how the symbols
of communication are combined to form grammatical sentences, the Semantics which
describes what the symbols denote, and the pragmatics which represents how the sym-
bols are interpreted. Most of the work of communication in multi-agent systems bor-
rows their inspiration from speech act theory, which describes how utterances are used
to achieve intensions. In the original work of speech act theory [4], communications
among participants are not only information transition, but also actions that change
the state of the world. The study of speech act focuses on the pragmatic aspect of
languages that is how language is used by people to achieve their goals and intentions
by communication. Austin [4] lists three aspects of speech acts: Locution which rep-
resents the act of making an utterance, Illocution which describes the intension of an
utterance, and Perlocution which represents the action that occurs as a result of an
illocution. In the work of Searle [89], five different types of speech acts are identified:
• Representatives: is an act commits the speaker to the truth of an expression.
• Directives: is an attempt to get the hearer to do something.
• Commissives: is an act commits the speaker to some course of action.
• Expressives: is an act expresses the mental state of a speaker.
• Declaratives: is an act effects the change of state.
In general, there are two components in a speech act: one is a performative verb (e.g.
“request”), while the other is the propositional content (e.g. “the desk is clean”). The
semantics of speech acts are defined using the precondition-delete-add list formalism of
planning research in [28]. Using this model, the mental states of agents are defined in
terms of beliefs and desires. Consider the semantics of the Request act where SPEAKER
requests HEARER to do action ACT in Table 2.3.
The first precondition states that a speaker doesn’t ask somebody to do something
unless he thinks they can do it. The second condition indicates that a speaker doesn’t
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Table 2.3: The Semantics of Request
Request(SPEAKER,HEARER,ACT)
precondition: (1) SPEAKER believes HEARER can do ACT;
(2) SPEAKER believes
HEARER believes HEARER can do ACT;
(3) SPEAKER believes SPEAKER wants ACT.
postcondition: (1) HEARER believes
SPEAKER believes SPEAKER wants ACT.
ask somebody unless he believes they can do it. The third condition shows that a
speaker doesn’t ask somebody unless the speaker wants it. The postcondition of this
act states that hearers are aware of the speaker’s desire.
Speech act theory inspires the development of Agent Communication Language
(ACL). An ACL contains three components: an ‘outer’ language (pragmatics) to ex-
press the primitives, an ‘inner’ language (syntax) to write the message, and vocabulary
(semantics) to describe the meaning of messages. A well-known ACL is “KQML” [25].
The Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language (KQML) is a high-level, message-
based communication language, which is developed in the project of Knowledge Sharing
Effort (KSE). There are three layers in a KQML message: the content layer, message
layer, and communication layer. The content layer contains the actual expression in
some languages. Sender and recipient can choose any languages they would like to share
knowledge. The message layer is used to encode a message which could contain the
type of content message or declaration message. A content message is used to describe
a speech act (e.g. query or assertion) that involves some sentences in a given content
language. A declaration message is used to provide information about the content mes-
sages that an agent will generate and would like to receive. The communication layer is
used by agents to exchange packages which are wrappers around messages that specify
communication attributes, such as the information of the sender and recipient.
KQML provides different kinds of performatives. For example, the performative ask-
if represents that a sender wants to know if the content is in the receiver’s knowledge
base. Those performatives in KQML are identified by reserved parameters. Table 2.4
summaries the reserved parameters and their meanings [57]. The semantics of each
performative can be defined in terms of preconditions which indicate the states for a
sender to send a performative and a receiver to receive and process it, postconditions
describe the states after the success of sending and processing messages, and completion
conditions indicate the final state of a conversation and the fulfillment of the original
intention of the performative [58].
Based on speech acts theory, the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA)
has developed another standard language FIPA ACL. The message structure of FIPA
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Table 2.4: Reserved Parameters and Their Meanings in KQML
Keyword Meaning
:sender the actual sender of the performative
:receiveer the actual receiver of the performative
:from the origin of the performative in :content when for-
ward is used.
:to the final destination of the performative in :content
when forward is used.
:in-reply-to the expected label in a response to a previous message
(same as the value of the previous message).
:reply-with the expected label in a response to the current mes-
sage.
:language the name of the representation language of the :con-
tent.
:ontology the name of the ontology (e.g., set of term definitions)
assumed in the :content parameter.
:content the information about which the performative ex-
presses an attitude.
ACL is composed of a set of parameters, such as performative (Type of communicative
acts), sender (Initiator of the message), and content (Content of the message). FIPA
ACL has 22 performatives and the syntax of these performatives is similar to KQML.
The semantics of FIPA ACL are defined based on the mental attitudes of agents, such
as belief, desires and intensions, via the SL (Semantic Language). The meaning of
those performatives is given in terms of Feasibility Conditions (FPs) and Rational
Effects (REs). FPs represent the conditions that should be true when a sender can
send a message. REs describe the expected outcome of a performative. However, the
REs cannot be guaranteed from sending the message. The semantics of performative
request is defined as follows.
<i,request(j,A)>
FP: (and(B i (capable_of j A)))
(not (B i (I j (done A))))
RE: (done A)
The FP says i believes that j is capable of action A and does not believe that j intends
to do A. The RE describes that this performative is used to get A done. The details of
FIPA ACL can be found in [38]. The languages of KQML and FIPA ACL have been
widely applicable in multi-agent systems. However, agents participant in conversations
have too many choices to make an utterance by using these languages, and thus cause
the problem of state-space explosion for dialogues [73]. To avoid state-space explosion,
rule-governed interactions between two or more players has been studied and this led
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to the development of formal dialogue games.
2.4.1 Dialogue Games
Dialogue games are made up of a set of communicative acts and set of rules to determine
the sequence of different acts. In the well-known work of Walton and Krabbe [111], di-
alogues are categories into different types according to the initial situation of dialogues,
the personal aims of participants and the main goal of the dialogue. The six dialogue
types in this typology are: persuasion dialogues (where one participant persuades an-
other to resolve conflicts of opinion); inquiry dialogues (where participants collaborate
to find evidence or proof for specific knowledge); negotiation dialogues (where partici-
pants need to reach a deal that resolves their conflicting interests); information seeking
dialogues (where participants aim to acquire or provide knowledge); deliberation dia-
logues (where participants aim to make decisions about what actions to adopt); eristic
dialogues (where participants quarrel verbally to vent perceived grievances). The mix-
tures of different types of dialogues are called embedded dialogues. For example, in
an online trading scenario, the buyer needs to seek information from sellers, and then
the seller may need to persuade the buyer to buy a specific item by introducing some
features of this product.
The syntax of a dialogue games contains the utterances which agents can make and
the rules to determine the order of making utterances. The rules regarding of assertions
are also included in the syntax of a dialogue game, because these rules possibly influence
the order of utterances. These assertions given by participants are stored as a public
readable database which forms the commitment store of a dialogue game. An utterance
can be divided into two layers: the outer layer is made up based on the locutions and the
inner layer contains the topics of discussion. In the work of McBurrney and Parsons [71],
a framework has been proposed to represent the specification of a dialogue game.
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Chapter 3
Motivation Example and
Proposed Certification
Framework
Software agents are involved in buying and selling items or services in agent mediated e-
commerce systems. The success of an agent mediated e-commerce system relies on the
trustworthiness between agents. To meet the requirements of trustworthiness, game
theory mechanisms which guarantee desirable properties have been carried out. For
example, these mechanisms can guarantee that the e-commerce system is strategy-
proofness (which means that there is a dominant strategy for agents) or false-name-
proofness (which means that agents cannot benefit from submitting multiple bids under
false names). The next major challenge in agent mediated e-commerce systems is to
enable software agents to comprehend the rules and social norms which govern the
behavior of new institutions in open, heterogeneous environments. These facilitate
agents to be capable of making rational decisions in the marketplace. Existing work
has addressed interoperability at the communication level (with agent communication
languages such as FIPA-ACL [38], and RDF [55] to underpin recent developments
within the Semantic Web [15]) thus allowing agents to communicate, the decision of
whether or not the communication is meaningful is still an open challenge. Agents may
understand how to conduct their behavior in certain familiar scenarios, and strategically
bid in marketplaces that adhere to certain rules (e.g., an English or Dutch auction).
However, such strategies may not be applicable to other markets, such as those that
based on Vickrey auctions. Within an open and dynamic environment (such as e-
commerce), agents might encounter a variety of auction houses, which forms part of
an agent mediated e-commerce scenario. It is therefore necessary for the agent to be
able to acquire a deeper model of the marketplaces which agents engaged in (other
than simply relying in simple classifications). This enables agents rationally determine
whether or not they should engage in the marketplace.
Agents should be able to query and comprehend the rules that govern an auction
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house, and verify desirable properties such as privacy, security, and economics. This
research focuses on the economic properties, by looking at specifying and verifying
game-theoretic properties for the single item and multiple items online auctions. An
important game-theoretic property is strategy-proofness, which means the existence of
a dominant strategy for the players indicates a strategy that is optimal regardless of
the game configuration. For example, truthful bidding can be the dominant strategy
in certain auction settings. Section 3.1 introduces a verification example of Vickrey
auctions, and Section 3.2 describes a certification framework.
3.1 A Pilot Example: Verification in a Vickrey Auction
In a single item Vickrey auction, bidders simultaneously submit their bids to an auc-
tioneer. The winner of a Vickrey auction is the highest bidder and the payment is the
second-highest bid. In this section, the focus is expressing a mechanism (a Vickrey
auction) and game-theoretic proofs in a machine checkable formalism. We have used
Coq [105], an interactive theorem prover, to carry out the formalizations of a Vickrey
auction in Section 3.1.1. Then, different bidding strategies have been specified followed
by the proofs of a dominant strategy for each bidder in Section 3.1.2.
3.1.1 Formalization of a Vickrey Auction within Coq
Consider n bidders with values vi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n who are competing for one item. If
bidder i wins the item and pays p, then bidder i’s utility is vi − p. A formal definition
of a Vickrey auction is given here.
Definition 1. Given one item and n bidders, the rule of a Vickrey auction is as:
• Bidders make bids b = (b1, ..., bn) simultaneously and all these bids are stored in
a list.
• The highest bidder wins the item and pays the second highest bid.
• If there are more than one highest bidders, then the one that close to the head of
the list is selected as the winner and pays own bid.
To specify a single item auction, a type of Item is defined, with one member item
to indicate the item that was sold.
Inductive Item : Type := item.
The following objects are also defined as types: bidder ID, bid, valuation to represent
respectively the sets of agents, their bids, and their valuations. Note that both bid
and valuation are declared as natural number to restrict that each bidder should give
nonnegative values to bids and valuations in the auction.
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Definition bidder_ID := nat.
Definition bid := nat.
Definition valuation := nat.
We then describe an inductive relation HasBid binding agents with their bids and
provides one function getBid to return the bid for a given relation.
Inductive HasBid : Type :=
hasBid : bidder_ID -> bid -> HasBid.
Definition getBid (p : HasBid) : nat :=
match p with
| hasBid bidder bid => bid
end.
Another relation HasVal binding a valuation with an agent, and the function getVal
returns the value of a valuation for a given HasVal relation.
Inductive HasVal : Type :=
hasVal : bidder_ID -> valuation -> HasVal.
Definition getVal (p : HasVal) : nat :=
match p with
| hasVal bidder val => val
end.
In a Vickrey auction, each agent has three different strategies: bidding truthfully
(the bid given by an agent equals to its valuation), bidding beyond the valuation, and
bidding below the valuation. We define a strategy as a mapping from valuation to
bid.
Definition strategy := valuation -> bid.
The three bidding strategies are defined as propositions. The definition of truthful
bidding is strategy is truthful. In this definition, the input is a variable s with
type of strategy, while the output is a proposition that the bid of the strategy equals
to v.
Definition strategy_is_truthful (s: strategy) : Prop :=
forall v,
v = s v.
The definitions strategy is up bidding and strategy is below bidding defines the
strategies that bid beyond and below valuation, respectively.
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Definition strategy_is_up_bidding (s: strategy) : Prop :=
forall v,
v < s v.
Definition strategy_is_below_bidding (s: strategy) : Prop :=
forall v,
v > s v.
Besides these three definitions for the bidding strategy in a Vickrey auction, we also
define a proposition strategy is not truthful represents non-truthful bidding.
Definition strategy_is_not_truthful (s: strategy) : Prop :=
forall v,
v <> s v.
In the following definition hasStrategy, the constructor has strategy has been ap-
plied to arguments bidder ID and strategy. This definition binds a bidder with a
specific strategy.
Inductive hasStrategy :Type :=
has_strategy : bidder_ID -> strategy -> hasStrategy.
To evaluate the payoffs of each agent in a Vickrey auction, we define the function
utility. This function has two inputs that represents the valuation and bid of an
agent and returns an integer. The approach to calculate the value of a utility will be
defined in another function eval utility.
Definition utility := valuation -> bid -> Z.
To compare the utility of each agent, we define a proposition utility better that
shows one utility u1 is better than the other utility u2.
Definition utility_better (u1 u2: utility) : Prop :=
forall v b,
u1 v b >= u2 v b.
One property that will be proved is that the utility of each agent is greater or equal
to zero in a Vickrey auction. The definition of utility nonnegative states that the
return value of this utility is nonnegative.
Definition utility_nonnegative (u1 : utility) : Prop :=
forall v b,
u1 v b >= 0.
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The winner of a Vickrey auction is the one with the highest bid, or if there is more
than one highest bidder, the one near the head of the bidding list will be the winner. We
define the recursive function get maximal bid to calculate the highest bid. The input
of this function is a list of strategy sl, which represents a list of bids that submitted
by every agents, and a variable v with type of valuation.
Fixpoint get_maximal_bid (sl: list strategy) (v: valuation): bid :=
match sl with
| nil => O
| cons s sl’ => let cb := s v in
let max_among_remains := (get_maximal_bid sl’ v) in
if (bge_nat cb max_among_remains)
then cb
else max_among_remains
end.
The function eval utility is defined to calculate the utility of an agent. In this
definition, s represents the strategy of an agent, while sl others contains all the
bidding strategies of other agents. If the bid given by this agent is greater than any
other bid, it will get the utility of vi − pi, where vi is the valuation of this agent, and
pi is the second highest bid. Otherwise, this agent will get utility of zero.
Definition eval_utility (s: strategy) (sl_others: list strategy) :
utility :=
fun (v: valuation) (b: bid)
=> let cb := s v in
let max_among_others := get_maximal_bid sl_others v in
if (bgt_nat cb max_among_others)
then ((Z.of_nat v) - (Z.of_nat max_among_others))
else 0.
3.1.2 Proof of Incentive Properties of a Vickrey Auction within Coq
The first property established in Coq is non-negative utility for all bidders.
Theorem 1. In a Vickrey auction, every truthtelling bidder is guaranteed non-negative
utility.
The related Coq formalization is as follows.
Theorem nonnegative_utility : forall (i : bidder_ID)
(s : strategy)(sl_others : list strategy),
s = truthful_strategy
-> utility_nonnegative (eval_utility s sl_others).
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Proof. In this theorem, s represents the strategy of a bidder, sl others is the strategy
of other bidders. Given s as the truthful bidding strategy in the premise, a bidder
will get non-negative utility. Function eval utility is used to calculate the utility of
a bidder. In this proof, each loser gets a utility of 0. If bidder i is the winner, then
its utility is vi − pi, where vi is the highest bid and pi is the second highest bid, thus
pi ≤ vi. Hence, vi − pi ≥ 0.
The second property established is that truthful bidding is a weakly dominant
strategy in a Vickrey auction.
Definition 2. In an auction, a strategy profile s∗i is weakly dominant strategy for
player i if
ui(s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ ui(si, s−i)∀si ∈ Si, s−i ∈ S−i
for some s−i ∈ S−i for any si 6= s∗i .
Definition 3. In an auction, s∗ ∈ S is a dominant strategy equilibrium if for
every player i ∈ N ,
ui(s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ ui(si, s−i)∀si ∈ Si, s−i ∈ S−i
.
Theorem 2. In a Vickrey auction, truthful bidding (bi = vi) is a weakly dominant
strategy.
The Coq formalization of this theorem is:
Theorem dominant_strategy:
forall (s1 s2: strategy) (bi vi : nat)
(sl_others : list strategy) (u1 u2: utility),
s1 = truthful_strategy
-> strategy_is_not_truthful s2
-> u1 = eval_utility s1 sl_others
-> u2 = eval_utility s2 sl_others
-> utility_better u1 u2.
In this theorem, we get two variables s1 and s2 with the type of strategy, two
natural number bi and vi represent the bidding and valuation of a bidder, the variable
sl others denotes a list of strategies while u1 and u2 are in the type of utility. We
have four premises in this theorem. First, s1 is a truthful bidding strategy. Second, s2
is not a truthful bidding strategy. Third, u1 is the utility with truthful bidding strategy
s1. The fourth premise means that u2 is the utility of untruthful bidding. Under these
premises, the theorem states that u1 is greater or equal to u2, i.e., the utility of truthful
bidding is better than untruthful bidding.
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Proof. The proof is implemented by case analysis. Suppose participant i bids in s1,
i.e. truthful bidding. There are two cases:
(1) i wins. This means that vi is the highest bid in the auction. As the definition of
eval utility, the value of u1 equals to vi subtracts the second highest bid. Suppose
i uses s2 to bid and gets utility of u2. There are two cases:
(a) i wins. Then u1 and u2 are equal.
(b) i loses. Then u2 becomes 0, which is less or equal to u1.
(2) i loses. This implies u1 equals to 0, and vi less than the highest bid. There are
also two cases for i to bid untruthfully:
(a) i loses. The value of u2 is 0, i.e. the same as u1.
(b) i wins. Bidder i submits a higher value and u2 becomes a non-positive value,
i.e. u2 less or equal to u1.
By applying to all bidders, truthful bidding constructs an equilibrium in weakly
dominant strategies.
Theorem 3. In a Vickrey auction, truthful bidding (bi = vi) is a weakly dominant
strategy. Hence b∗ = v is a dominant strategy equilibrium.
The Coq formalization of this theorem is:
Theorem dominant_strategy_equilibrium:
forall (i : bidder_ID)(v : nat)
(s1 s2: strategy)(sl_others : list strategy)
(u1 u2: utility) (h1 : hasStrategy)
(h2 : hasStrategy),
h1 = has_strategy i s1
-> h2 = has_strategy i s2
-> s1 = truthful_strategy
-> strategy_is_not_truthful s2
-> u1 = eval_utility s1 sl_others
-> u2 = eval_utility s2 sl_others
-> utility_better u1 u2.
The proof of this theorem is similar to the above theorem.
3.2 Certification Framework
In the above example, some desirable properties of a Vickrey auction within the proof
assistant Coq have been formalized and proved. This example illustrates the feasibility
of the idea that the economic properties of an auction can be constructed for future
certification by buyer agents. In order to effectively enable automatic checking of
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desirable properties, we need to take into account the fact that software agents have
limited computer resources and constrained in their reasoning. The main difficulty for
a software agent is to find the best possible or optimal bidding strategy on its own or
to optimize its utility out of various strategies in the same way as humans perform. To
address this difficulty, the specification of auction protocols and proofs are published
in a machine-readable formalism, and then automatic checking is facilitated by the
software agents which reduces the computational complexity. To achieve this, we rely
on the Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) idea as it allows us to shift the burden of proof
from the buyer agent to the auctioneer who can spend time to prove a claimed property
once for all. Thus it can be checked by any agent who is willing to join the auction
house.
The PCC is a paradigm that enables a computer system to automatically ensure
that a computer code provided by a foreign agent is safe for installation and execution.
A weakness of the original PCC was that the soundness of the verification condition
generator is not proved. To overcome this weakness, Foundational PCC (FPCC) [2]
provides us with stronger semantic foundations to PCC by generating verification con-
ditions directly from the operational semantics. Figure 3.1 illustrates our framework
that adapts FPCC to certify auction properties. At the producer or auctioneers side,
we have the specifications of the auction mechanism along with the proofs of desirable
properties in a machine-checkable formalism in the form of a Coq file. The certifica-
tion procedure works as follows. The buyer agent arriving at the auction house can
download its specification and the claimed proof of a desirable property. Then, the
buyer requests the proof checker coqhk, which is a standalone verifier for Coq proofs,
to the auctioneer. The auctioneer provides the address of the proof checker which is
stored by a trusted third party (e.g., the home page of Coq) to the buyer. After the
proof checker is installed to the consumer side, the buyer can perform all verifications
of claimed properties of the auction before deciding to join and with which bidding
strategy.
The objective of this work is to enable software agents in an open e-commerce system
to understand a published specification of a trading protocol, to request for a formal
or informal evidence of desirable properties, and automatically check those evidences.
Finally, agents decide whether or not to participate in the trading. Furthermore, agents
need to automatically composite web services to fulfill their requirements. To achieve
our research objective, the following issues should be addressed.
1. Machine understandable specifications of a set of trading protocols that related
to e-commerce systems. These trading protocols can be expressed as a format of
Web services.
2. Using a logical framework to formally specify trading protocols and provide proofs
of desirable properties of the trading protocols.
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Figure 3.1: The Adapted FPCC Certification Paradigm
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3. Mapping the original specification to the specification that expressed in the logical
framework.
4. An extension of the PCC paradigm that enables buyer agents to automatically
check the correctness of proofs that is constructed by the seller agents.
5. An interaction mechanism that supports automatically communication between
buyer agents and seller agents.
6. A mechanism that supports buyer agents to automatically composite Web services
that fulfill the requirements of a trading.
A certification framework which combines a series of techniques is proposed to
meet the above mentioned issues. The first issue is to use a machine-understandable
language, such as OWL-S, to describe the specification of auction mechanisms which
have been widely used in off-line and online trading. Secondly, the above specifica-
tion will be translated to another specification, which is formalized within Coq that
provides a meta-language to specify programs. The translation process preserves the
semantics of the given specification. Thirdly, we will construct the proofs of desirable
properties of the specification within the interactive theorem prover Coq. Fourthly,
we will build dialogue games using the agent development platform JADE to enable
automatic communication between buyer agents and auctioneer agents. The FPCC
paradigm will be integrated into the dialogue games to make buyer agents check the
correctness of proofs. At last, dialogue games will be applied to realize automatic
services composition in e-commerce systems.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter, some desirable properties of a Vickrey auction have been formalized
and proved within an interactive theorem prover Coq. This pivot example shows the
feasibility of verifying desirable properties of online trading mechanisms. Then the
certification framework has been proposed that combines a series of techniques such as
Semantic Web Services, Foundational Proof-Carrying Code (FPCC), interactive theo-
rem proving and dialogue games. It allows an auctioneer to publish the specification of
auction mechanisms using a machine-understandable language, and then the auctioneer
to translate the above specification to another specification which is formalized within
Coq; this translation preserves the semantics of the given specification. It allows the
auctioneer to construct proofs of desirable properties of a specification within Coq,
and to publish the auction mechanism along with the proofs of desirable properties. It
allows the potential buyer agent to read the published protocol, to make sense of it, and
at will, to check the proof of a given property by using a simple trusted checker, which
makes the automatic checking procedure computationally reasonable. The potential
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buyer makes its decision about whether or not to participate in the auction accord-
ing to the results of communication with the auctioneer. It allows the composition
of Semantic Web Services on the basis of communication between buyer agents and
auctioneers.
In the next chapter, the Semantic Web Service language OWL-S will be used to
describe a specification of an English auction, and then an imperative language that
preserve the semantics of OWL-S within Coq will be defined, followed by the trans-
lation of the specification from OWL-S to the imperative language, and the proof of
desirable properties of the specification.
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Chapter 4
Formal Specification and
Verification
A specification provides a high-level description of behaviors and properties of a system.
Compared to an informal specification which is represented in a non-mathematical
form, formal specifications provide a precise description of software systems by using
a language whose syntax and semantics are formally defined. The need of formal
definitions requires specification languages to express abstract and precise mathematical
concepts which can be drawn from set theory, logic and algebra. Formal specifications
provide an abstract view of systems which describes what a system should accomplish
and enable inferring interesting properties from the specification. The formal software
verification is to ensure a system behave according to its specification. One verification
approach is to use formal proofs to guarantee the properties of a specification. A sound
proof system can imply that a program meets its specification for all inputs. Another
advantage of formal verification is that the correctness of those proofs is machine-
checked.
We consider electronic markets based on single item auctions whose mechanisms
are described in machine readable formalism, e.g. OWL-S, so that software agents
can understand their rules. However, we would like to enable potential participants to
check that the auction house is trustworthy before entering it and bid for items on sale
by verifying desirable properties. To construct proofs, we have used the proof assistant
Coq. This implies that the auction mechanism needs to be transformed into Coq
descriptions in an automated fashion so that proofs can be developed from within Coq.
However, bugs in the transformation process may potentially invalidate the assurances
almost not gained by certifying certain desirable auction properties. Therefore it has
to be guaranteed that the transformed mechanism is semantically equivalent to the
original one.
There is already a large body of literature on certifying program transformations [61].
Leroy’s compositional approach in certifying a compiler is most relevant to this work:
certifying that all phases of the transformation are correct. In our case, we have de-
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fined the target language (a WHILE language) within Coq to mirror the input language
(OWL-S) and then have used a one to one mapping to establish the correctness of the
transformations. This is carried out through using natural semantics of computer pro-
grams to establish that the semantics of the target is equivalent to that of the source
program. Besides the requirement to have a semantics-preserving transformation, we
would like to show how to use the Hoare Logic to prove desirable auction properties
from within Coq. This approach is different from the pivot example in Chapter 3,
wherein we have relied upon Coq’s constructive approach to carry out the verification
of some game-theoretic properties of a Vickrey auction mechanism.
In terms of prototype implementation, we have used Antlr [84] to automatically
transform an OWL-S auction description into a specified Coq imperative language.
Antlr is a widely used tool to read, process, or translate structured data or texts
such as source computer programs. To fully certify the program translation step in
the verification approach, we can proceed as in Leroy’s paper [61] by implementing all
transformation phases within Coq and the Ocaml programming language. However,
we would like to point out at least an example of such a certifying compiler and focus
more on verifying auction properties. Structurally, our transformation is a one-to-one
mapping between two kinds of WHILE languages and the background information we
have described in Section 2.3.2 is enough to understand the semantics-preserving nature
of our transformation framework. Besides, note that Leroy’s approach [61] separates
the algorithmic and implementation issues in the certification framework.
In this chapter, the first to be introduced is an auction model and the related
machine readable description of this model using OWL-S (“OWL for Services”) in
Section 4.1. The translation of an OWL-S specification into a Coq specification will
be explained in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, the certification of desirable properties will
be described. The related work is presented in Section 4.4 and the summary of this
chapter is in Section 4.5.
4.1 Auction Model and Description
This section will introduce the background information of game theoretic properties
in auctions, and provide the description of an English auction using a Semantic Web
Service description language OWL-S.
4.1.1 Auction Model and Incentive Properties
We consider single item online auctions that run over a fixed time period in which
the seller may have reserve revenue under which items cannot be sold. This reserve
revenue can typically be the reserve price for the item on sale. After a bid, the seller
waits for some time before accepting the bid if it yields a revenue that is greater or
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equal to the reserve one or waits for the expiry time before deciding whether to reject
or accept the bid. In this work, we aim at describing online auctions by using the
OWL-S specification language and then translate the resulting description into Coq
specifications in order to verify some desirable auction properties. These properties
are used to ensure trust in the auction house and therefore make it more attractive to
potential buyers or profitable for the seller. For example, an online buyer may want to
have a guarantee that the auction is always carried out as specified or that the auction
is free from collusion. Some of those properties can be formalized and proved using
theorem provers. Therefore, the focus will be on the following incentive properties.
• For a buyer participant, bidding up to its valuation is the optimal strategy.
• The highest bidder wins the auction.
• The payment is indeed the highest bid.
4.1.2 Machine Readable Description
Online auctions for software agents are a good application wherein data can be pro-
cessed by automated reasoning tools. Logic-based languages are useful tools to model
and reason about systems. They allow researchers to specify behavioral requirements
of components of a system and to formulate desirable properties for an individual com-
ponent or the entire system. The Semantic Web [15] enables us to describe and reason
about Web services by using ontologies. Ontologies are used to formally describe the
semantics of terms representing an area of knowledge and give explicit meaning to the
information, thus allowing for automated reasoning, semantic search and knowledge
management in a specific area of knowledge. OWL [78], a W3C standard, is a descrip-
tion logic-based language that enables researcher to describe ontologies by using basic
constructs such as concept definitions and relations between them. It has been used in
a wide range of areas including biology, medicine, or aerospace [10, 30]. In this work,
it is advocated to use Semantic Web for at least the following reasons.
• It is expressive enough so that a range of auction mechanisms can be described
in it.
• It provides us with a machine readable formalism enabling software agents to
understand auction mechanisms.
• There is a scope for semantics interoperability for heterogeneous software agents
engaging in an auction.
An auction is viewed as a Web service with enough logical attachments, enabling a
software agent to understand the auction rules and to carry out verifications of claimed
properties.
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Logic-based languages are usually chosen for their expressivity or on the fact that
their underlying logic is sound, complete or decidable. Expressivity provides powerful
constructs to describe things that may not be otherwise expressed. Soundness ensures
that if a property φ can be deduced from a system (a set of statements) Γ (Γ ` φ), then
φ is true as long as Γ is satisfied (Γ |= φ). Completeness states that any true statement
can be established by proof steps in the logic’s calculus. Formally Γ |= φ implies Γ ` φ.
A logic is decidable if we can construct a terminating algorithm that decides for any
well-formed formula if it is true or false.
To enable automated reasoning in the auction system, we have used the ontology
language OWL-S, which is corresponding to OWL, to build up the auction ontology.
See [8] for further details.
The OWL-S Description Language
In this section, we argue that we can describe online auction houses as Web services
by using the OWL-S language, which provides us with machine readable formalism
and logical reasoning capabilities for software agents. We will start by showing that
OWL-S is expressive enough to enable us to describe online auction mechanisms.
To describe online auctions, we may ask why not use XML (Extensible Markup
Language) as a description language for this task. XML provides a syntactic approach
but no logical basis for reasoning. The meaning of the relationships between XML ele-
ments cannot be encoded. A language that builds upon XML and allows for reasoning
is the OWL-DL (Web Ontology Language), which is based on DL (Description Logic).
Description logics are a family of logics that are decidable fragments of first-order logic.
OWL-DL is sound, complete, and decidable but with limited expressivity. For exam-
ple, we cannot express arithmetic statements that ‘The winner’s utility is the value of
valuation minus payment’.
ex
p
ressiven
ess
XML: Syntactic, No Logic
“Agent buyer has bid 100.”
OWL-DL: Description Logic
sound, complete, decidable
“Auction A has at least 2 buyers.”
SWRL: OWL-DL + RuleML (including
MathML and Horn rules)
sound, complete, undecidable
“Utility = Valuation - Payment”
OWL-S: SWRL + Programming Constructs
sound, complete, undecidable
“While newbid >currentbid Do ”
To extend OWL-DL, the SWRL (Semantic Web Rule Language) combines OWL-
DL with RuleML that includes among others, MathML and Horn rules. As a result,
SWRL is more expressive than OWL-DL but SWRL is not decidable [86]. However,
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in SWRL, we cannot express the statement that ‘while the newbid is greater than
the currentbid do’. Furthermore, auction mechanisms can be viewed as functions with
inputs, outputs, preconditions or post-conditions. They may contain complex program-
ming constructs such as branching or iterations. OWL-S enables us to describe online
auctions as Web Services.
An OWL-S description is mainly composed of a service profile for advertising and
discovering services; a process model, which describes the operation of a service; and
the grounding, which specifies how to access a service. In our case, the process contains
information about inputs, outputs, and a natural language description of the auction,
e.g., this is an English auction. The grounding contains information on the service
location so that an agent can run the service by using the OWL-S API. The process
model is described as follows.
define composite process Auction
(inputs: (...)
outputs: (...)
preconditions: (...)
results: (...)
)
{ // Process’s Body
WinDetermAlgo(...);
PayeAndUtil(...) }
<process:CompositeProcess rdf:ID="EnglishAuction">
<process:hasInput> ...
<process:hasOutput>
<process:hasPrecondition> ...
<process:hasResult> ...
...
<process:CompositeProcess rdf:ID="WinDetermAlgo"> ...
<process:CompositeProcess rdf:ID="PayeAndUtil"> ...
</process:CompositeProcess>
The auction process model is basically composed of inputs, outputs, preconditions,
results and a composition of two processes, which are the winner determination algo-
rithm WinDetermAlgo and PayeAndUtil that calculates the payments as well as the
utilities for the buyer agents. The following sample description provides a more detailed
example from WinDetermAlgo. It shows that is if CurrentBid is less than NewBid, then
the value of CurrentBid and CurrentWinner will be updated.
<process:If-Then-Else rdf:ID="If-Then-Else">
<process:ifCondition>
<expr:SWRL-Condition>
<expr:expressionObject>
<swrl:AtomList>
<rdf:first>
<swrl:BuiltinAtom>
<swrl:builtin rdf:resource="&swrlb;#lessThan"/>
<swrl:arguments>
<rdf:List>
<rdf:first rdf:resource="#CurrentBid"/>
<rdf:rest>
<rdf:List>
<rdf:first rdf:resource="#NewBid"/>
<rdf:rest rdf:resource="&rdf;#nil"/>
</rdf:List>
</rdf:rest>
</rdf:List>
</swrl:arguments>
</swrl:BuiltinAtom>
</rdf:first>
<rdf:rest rdf:resource="&rdf;#nil"/>
</swrl:AtomList>
</expr:expressionObject>
</expr:SWRL-Condition>
</process:ifCondition>
<process:then>
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<process:Sequence>
<process:components>
<process:ControlConstructList>
<list:first rdf:resource="#UpdateCurrentBid"/>
<rdf:rest>
<rdf:List>
<rdf:first rdf:resource="#UpdateCurrentWinner"/>
<rdf:rest rdf:resource="&rdf;#nil"/>
</rdf:List>
</rdf:rest>
</process:ControlConstructList>
</process:components>
</process:Sequence>
</process:then>
<process:else>
<process:Sequence>
<process:components>
<process:ControlConstructList>
<list:first rdf:resource="#Skip"/>
<list:rest rdf:resource="&list;#nil"/>
</process:ControlConstructList>
</process:components>
</process:Sequence>
</process:else>
</process:If-Then-Else>
4.2 Automated Program Translation
In Section 4.1.2, we have sketched how online auction mechanisms can be described
using the OWL-S description language in order to have machine-understandable proto-
cols by software agents. Furthermore, we have illustrated [9] that auction mechanisms
can be specified within Coq so as to develop machine-checkable proofs of desirable
mechanism properties that can be automatically verified by software agents [9]. To
bridge the gap between these two processes, we have used Antlr to systematically
transform OWL-S code into Coq specifications by
1. Identifying a subset of the OWL-S language formed by key constructs used in
our description of auction mechanisms; this basically mirrors a WHILE-language
for imperative programming.
2. Translating these OWL-S constructs into a tailored subset of Coq specifications
so that an OWL-S program or logical formula can be transformed into a Coq
one in an automated fashion.
This translation is semantics-preserving since it is a one-to-one mapping from the source
language (a subset of OWL-S) into the target language (a specialized Coq WHILE-
language).
4.2.1 Translation Architecture
The structure of the translator is an Antlr grammar file (owlsmall.g), a Java class
(Olws2Coq.java) that transforms an OWL-S parse tree into a valid Coq parse tree
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and a main program that launches the generated parser and the parse tree transformer
for an input OWL-S code.
Antlr [84] is a powerful tool that takes as input a formal language description or
EBNF grammar to generate a parser for that language along with tree-walkers that can
be used to visit the nodes of those trees and run application-specific code. For an input
code in the input language, it generates appropriate representations as parse trees that
can be transformed into parse trees for a target language and be unparsed or pretty-
printed. Antlr parsers use the alleged Adaptive LL(*) that performs a just-in-time
analysis of the input grammar in lieu of analyzing it statically before execution. It is a
widely used tool to read, process, or translate structured data or texts such as source
computer programs.
We have proceeded by translating an OWL-S process model, which includes vari-
able declarations, inputs, outputs, preconditions, results, and IF and WHILE con-
structs, into the target language. In the following diagram, we illustrate how the
transformation can preserve the semantics of the original mechanism: a mechanism M,
written in OWL-S, is translated into a COQ imperative language description and we
would like to ensure that the semantics of the target is equivalent to that of the source
code. In this way, true or false properties that are established from within Coq can be
inferred back into the OWL-S description.
MOWL-S
Semantics

Translation //MCoq
Semantics
JMOWL-SK JMCoqK
Syntax and Semantics of the Coq Imperative language
We have used Coq as a meta-language to define the syntax and semantics for the
simple imperative language described in Section 2.3.2. Let us start by defining few
basic variables to be used in future definitions. A bidder is defined as a type and the
relation bidderpair binds a bidder with a bid, which is a natural number.
Variable bidder : Type.
Inductive bidderpair : Type :=
bpair : bidder -> nat -> bidderpair.
Variables are represented by identifiers Id that are mapped into natural numbers in
an obvious and incremental way. For simplicity, we assume that all variables are global
and this does not conflict with the notion of variable scope in OWL-S.
Inductive id : Type :=
Id : nat -> id.
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The state of all variables at some point in the execution of a program is represented
as a mapping from identifiers to natural numbers.
Definition state := id -> nat.
After a variable and a state are defined, the arithmetic and Boolean expressions
are defined. Each definition is composed of two functions. One function is to define
the syntax and the other is to define the semantics. The syntax of the arithmetic
expressions contains basic data types (e.g. bidderpair (ABidderp), numbers (ANum) and
identifier (AId)), arithmetic expressions (e.g., addition (APlus), subtraction (AMinus)
and multiplication (AMult)) and operations on a List data structure (e.g., AHeadb,
ATail, ACons and ANil). The semantics of these mathematical operations are defined
as a relational function. For example, the operation AHeadb returns the bid of the first
bidder in a list.
The syntax of the Boolean expressions defines two basic types: True (BTrue) and
False (BFalse). It also contains the syntax of comparison operators, such as equality
(BEq), less than (BLt) and negation (BNot). Another term in this syntax is BIsCons,
which is used to check whether a list is empty or not. The semantics for the Boolean
expressions are also defined as a relational function. For readability, we do not show the
Coq code for these two expressions. We finally define the syntax of our mini-language as
in the Coq definition of com below for commands such as skip, assignment, conditional
statements, sequences, and loops. To ease up the presentation, we have introduced the
Notation declarations to abbreviate these commands.
Inductive com : Type :=
| CSkip : com
| CAsgn : id -> aexp -> com
| CSeq : com -> com -> com
| CIf : bexp -> com -> com -> com
| CWhile : bexp -> com -> com
| CRepeat : com -> bexp -> com.
Notation "’SKIP’" :=
CSkip.
Notation "c1 ; c2" :=
(CSeq c1 c2) (at level 80, right associativity).
Notation "X ’::=’ a" :=
(CAsgn X a) (at level 60).
Notation "’WHILE’ b ’DO’ c ’END’" :=
(CWhile b c) (at level 80, right associativity).
Notation "’IFB’ e1 ’THEN’ e2 ’ELSE’ e3 ’FI’" :=
(CIf e1 e2 e3) (at level 80, right associativity).
Notation "’REPEAT’ e1 ’UNTIL’ b2 ’END’" :=
(CRepeat e1 b2) (at level 80, right associativity).
The following definition ceval defines the semantics of commands in our Coq
imperative language. For example, ESeq means that the state will change from st to
st’ after executing command c1, and after running command c2, the state moves to
st’’.
Inductive ceval : state -> com -> state -> Prop :=
| ESkip : forall st,
ceval st SKIP st
| EAss : forall st a1 n X,
aeval st a1 = n ->
ceval st (X ::= a1) (update st X n)
| ESeq : forall c1 c2 st st’ st’’,
ceval st c1 st’ ->
ceval st’ c2 st’’ ->
ceval st (c1 ; c2) st’’
...
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Since we have defined the syntax and semantics of all the components of our Coq
imperative language, we can proceed by showing how we have translated the OWL-S
into the Coq descriptions.
Translating Pre- and Post- conditions and Effect
Hoare Logic is used as a paradigm to implement program verification. On the one
hand, it provides a way to describe the pre/post conditions of programs by defining
Hoare triples. On the other hand, it provides compositional proof rules to prove the
validity of Hoare triples. To build up the Hoare triples, we need to make assertions
about properties that hold during the execution of a program. An Assertion is defined
as a proposition indexed by a state.
Definition Assertion := state -> Prop.
A Hoare triple is composed of three components: the precondition P, command c
and post-condition Q. As recalled in Section 2.3.2, a Hoare triple {P} c {Q} is valid iff
the claimed relation among P, c and Q is true. This means that if a command c starts
in a state where P is true, it will move to a state wherein Q is true when c terminates.
Definition hoare_triple (P:Assertion)
(c:com) (Q:Assertion) : Prop :=
forall st st’,
c / st || st’ ->
P st ->
Q st’.
Notation "{{ P }} c {{ Q }}" := (hoare_triple P c Q) (at level 90, c at next level).
The proof rules of Hoare logic provide a compositional way to prove the validity
of Hoare triples. For each command that was defined in com, we have constructed its
inference rule in the usual way. These inference rules are used to prove the desirable
property in Section 4.3. The precondition and effect in OWL-S is mapped to the
precondition and postcondition of Hoare triples, respectively.
Translating SWRL into our Coq Imperative Language
The Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) is a proposed language to express rules
in the Semantic Web. SWRL is used to represent the pre/post-conditions in OWL-S,
and it is also used to express comparison and arithmetic operations. In our project,
we have just selected a subset of the SWRL, which are used to build up the auction
mechanism. The translation of these operations into our Coq imperative language is
shown in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: The Mapping of SWRL and Coq definitions
SWRL Coq definitions
Comparison
swrlb:equal
swrlb:lessThan
BEq
BLt
Arithmetic Operations
swrlb:add
swrlb:subtract
swrlb:multiply
APlus
AMinus
AMult
List Operations
swrlb:listConcat
swrlb:rest
swrlb:empty
Acons
ATail
BIsCons
To illustrate this translation, let us consider the addition of 5 and 3. This operation
can be expressed as swrlb:add(?x,5,3) in SWRL, while the related Coq imperative
language formula should be X ::= (APlus (ANum 5) (ANum 3)).
Translating Variable Declarations
In OWL-S, variable declarations are part of Input, Output and Local. As mentioned
in the OWL-S standards document, the variables of input, output and local have the
same scope as the entire process they occur in. The grammar of these three elements
is defined as follows.
<!-- inputs -->
inputs ::= ’<process:hasInput>’
input ’</process:hasInput>’ inputs;
input ::= ’<process:Input
rdf:ID=’ quotedString ’>’
parameterType ’</process:Input>’;
<!-- outputs -->
outputs ::= ’<process:hasOutput>’
output ’</process:hasOutput>’ outputs;
output ::= ’<process:Output
rdf:ID=’ quotedString ’>’
parameterType ’</process:Output>’;
<!-- locals -->
locals ::= ’<process:hasOutput>’
local ’</process:hasOutput>’ locals;
local ::= ’<process:Loc
rdf:ID=’ quotedString ’>’
parameterType ’</process:Loc>’;
parameterType ::= ’<process:parameterType
rdf:datatype=’ xsdURI ’>’
type ’</process:parameterType>’;
The keyword type in the line of parameterType, could be any XML data type or
the type of objects that are defined as an OWL Class. The corresponding variable
declaration in our Coq imperative language is defined as:
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Definition VARIABLE : id := Id NUM.
In this declaration, VARIABLE is the variable name and NUM is a unique identifier for
this variable.
Translating an Assignment
The OWL-S assignment operation is defined as an element of data flow, output binding,
Set or Produce operations. Here, we give one example of how we map an output binding
to an assignment operation in our Coq imperative language. The grammar of an output
binding can be described as below.
<!-- OutputBinding -->
OutputBinding ::= ’<process:OutputBinding>’
toVar valueSource
’<process:OutputBinding>’ OutputBinding;
toVar ::= ’<process:toVar
rdf:resource=’ quotedString ’/>’;
valueSource ::= ’<process:ValueOf>’
fromProcess theVar’</process:ValueOf>’;
fromProcess ::= ’<process:fromProcess
rdf:resource="&process;#ThisPerform"/>’;
theVar ::= ’<process:theVar
rdf:resource=’ quotedString ’/>’;
The keyword quotedString in the line of theVar is defined as the combination of
characters. The related assignment operation in our Coq imperative language is in the
format of ‘‘X ’::=’ a’’. The pre- and post- conditions of an OWL-S description
are translated to comments in our Coq imperative language. Since we have defined
the Hoare Logic rules in Coq, when we develop a proof, we can introduce the related
pre- or post- conditions to this proof and verify their correctness for example.
Translating Control Constructs
Composite processes in OWL-S can be decomposed into atomic processes by us-
ing control constructs. OWL-S contains ten control constructs including Sequence,
Split, Choice, If-Then-Else and Repeat-While. To give an idea of the translation of
these complex structures, we describe how we have carried out the translation of the
If-Then-Else and Repeat-While control constructs. The grammar of the control
constructs If-Then-Else and Repeat-While is defined as follows.
<!-- If-Then-Else -->
ifthenelse ::= ’<process:composedOf>’
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’<process:If-Then-Else
rdf:ID=’ quotedString ’>’
if then else
’</process:If-Then-Else>’
’</process:composedOf>’;
if ::= ’<process:ifCondition>’
SWRL-Condition ’</process:ifCondition>’;
then ::= ’<process:then>’
ControlConstruct ’</process:then>’;
else ::= ’<process:else>’
ControlConstruct ’</process:else>’;
<!-- Repeat-While -->
repeatWhile ::= ’<process:Repeat-While
rdf:ID=’ quotedString ’>’
whileCondition whileProcess
’</process:Repeat-While>’ ;
whileCondition ::= ’<process:whileCondition>’
SWRL-Condition ’</process:whileCondition>’;
whileProcess ::= ’<process:whileProcess
rdf:resource=’ quotedString ’/>’;
The keyword SWRL-Condition is the condition that is written in SWRL, and
ControlConstruct represents the combination of control constructs. The related syn-
tax of the branching and while commands in our Coq imperative language are defined
respectively as follows.
’IFB’ e1 ’THEN’ e2 ’ELSE’ e3 ’FI’
’WHILE’ b ’DO’ c ’END’
4.3 Certifying Desirable Properties
In this section, we will present a sample code which is written using previously de-
fined imperative language for an English auction, and then provide the proofs of some
incentive properties.
4.3.1 Proof Development
A well-defined auction mechanism can be viewed as a function that maps a set of
typed agents into outcomes characterized by utilities usually defined as linear func-
tions. Not only, we need to specify rules and properties but we also need to carry out
some calculations. The constructive approach provided by Coq offers possibilities to
describe auctions along with desirable properties and prove them. To illustrate how
we can specify an auction within Coq, let us consider the English auction example. In
the sample code of Table 4.2, ListBP is a list of buyers with their own bid variable.
CurrentWinner and CurrentBid are two variables to store the information of buyers
and their bids. NewBuyer is the buyer and NewBid is the bid of this buyer in one round
of the auction. Function AHeadBuyer is used to find the first buyer in the bidding list,
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while function AHeadBid is used to find the bid of the first buyer. The third function
ATail returns the tail of a list. The auction runs from the first bidder in the bidders’
list to the last bidder of the list. In each round, a bidder, who does not want to submit
a bid is supposed to have a lower bid for the round. This way, we can simulate the
English auction.
Table 4.2: The Sample Code of an English Auction
(1) Definition ListBP : id := Id 0.
(2) Definition CurrentBid : id := Id 1.
(3) Definition CurrentWinner : id := Id 2.
(4) Definition NewBuyer : id := Id 3.
(5) Definition NewBid : id := Id 4.
(6) Definition sample_englishAuction :=
(7) WHILE BIsCons (AId ListBP) DO
(8) NewBuyer ::= AHeadBuyer (AId ListBP);
(9) NewBid ::= AHeadBid (AId ListBP);
(10) IFB (BLt (AId CurrentBid )(AId NewBid)) THEN
(11) CurrentBid ::= (AId NewBid);
(12) CurrentWinner ::= (AId NewBuyer)
(13) ELSE
(14) SKIP
(15) FI;
(16) ListBP ::= ATail (AId ListBP)
(17) END.
Using this program, we have proved the following desirable properties: the payment
is equal to the highest bid, and the winner has the highest bid. To construct these
proofs, we need to define few functions and prove some lemmas. The function appe is
used to add an element to the end of a list:
Fixpoint appe {X:Type} (l:list X) (v:X) : (list X) :=
match l with
| nil => [v]
| cons h t => h :: (appe t v)
end.
We have proved the following lemma appe equation, which states that given a list
x, an element h and another list y; the result of the operation appe x h ++ y is equal
to x ++ h :: y, wherein ++ represents the traditional ‘append’ operation and :: the
usual ‘cons’ operation.
Lemma 1 (appe equation). forall (A:Type) (h:A) (x y : list A),
appe x h ++ y = x ++ h :: y.
Proof. The proof is by induction on list x. Firstly, we show the lemma is true when x
is nil, then we show it is true when x is not empty.
The function max is defined to find the maximum bid in a bidding list. Two lemmas
are proved for the function max. The lemma max one states the following: given the
highest bid cb in the current list p and a new bid whose value comes from a bidderpair
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h, if the value of the new bid is greater than cb, then it becomes the highest bid in the
resulting list (appe p h).
Lemma 2 (max one). forall (cb:nat) (p: list bidderpair) (h:bidderpair),
cb = max p, cb < getbid h -> getbid h = max (appe p h).
Proof. The proof uses the fact that cb is the maximum value in the list of p and h is
a new bid which is greater than cb, then h is the maximum value in the new list.
We also prove the following lemma max two, which states that given the highest bid
cb in the current list p and a new bid from h; if cb is not less than this bid, then cb is
the highest bid in the resulting list (appe p h).
Lemma 3 (max two). forall (cb:nat) (p: list bidderpair) (h:bidderpair),
cb = max p, ~cb < getbid h -> cb = max (appe p h).
Proof. The proof uses the fact that cb is the maximum value in the list of p and h is
a new bid which is less than cb, then cb is the maximum value in the new list.
We now explain our need of the predicate appear in, which is defined to state
whether a given element appears in a list. Two lemmas on the appear in were proved.
Lemma 4 shows that an element e appears in the resulting list (appe l e). Lemma 5
shows that if an element e appears in list l, then we can deduce that e appears in the
resulting list (appe l b).
Lemma 4 (appears in snoc1). forall e l, appear_in e (appe l e).
Proof. The proof follows from the definition of appear in.
Lemma 5 (appears in snoc2). forall e b l,
appear_in e l ->
appear_in e (appe l b).
Proof. The proof follows from the definition of appear in.
In the following section, we will provide the proofs of several theorems.
Theorem 4. In an English auction, the payment equals to the highest bid.
Theorem 5. In an English auction, the winner has the highest bid.
The proofs of these two theorems are carried out using Hoare-style calculus and are
shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 illustrates a Coq proof that in the end of the English auction, the value of
CurrentBid is the highest bid and CurrentWinner has CurrentBid. By assigning the
value of CurrentBid to a payment variable and CurrentWinner to a variable, we can
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Table 4.3: Proof Sketch of a Sample of an English Auction
(1) {{[(0,0)]::ListBP = l ∧ CurrentBid = 0 ∧ CurrentWinner = 0 ∧ NewBid = 0 ∧ NewBuyer = 0}}
(2) {{exists p, p++X=l ∧ CurrentBid = (max p) ∧ appear in (CurrentWinner,CurrentBid) p}}
WHILE BIsCons (AId ListBP) DO
(3) {{exists p, p++X=l ∧ CurrentBid = (max p) ∧ appear in (CurrentWinner,CurrentBid) p
∧ (BIsCons (AId ListBP))}}
(4) {{exists p, p++X=l ∧ CurrentBid = (max p) ∧ appear in (CurrentWinner,CurrentBid) p
∧ AHeadBuyer ListBP = AHeadBuyer ListBP ∧ AHeadBid ListBP = AHeadBid ListBP
∧ (BIsCons (AId ListBP))}}
NewBuyer ::= AHeadBuyer (AId ListBP);
(5) {{exists p, p++X=l ∧ CurrentBid = (max p) ∧ appear in (CurrentWinner,CurrentBid) p
∧ NewBuyer = AHeadBuyer ListBP ∧ AHeadBid ListBP = AHeadBid ListBP
∧ (BIsCons (AId ListBP))}}
NewBid ::= AHeadBid (AId ListBP);
(6) {{exists p, p++X=l ∧ CurrentBid = (max p) ∧ appear in (CurrentWinner,CurrentBid) p
∧ NewBuyer = AHeadBuyer ListBP ∧ NewBid = AHeadBid ListBP
∧ (BIsCons (AId ListBP))}}
IFB (BLt (AId CurrentBid) (AId newBid)) THEN
(7) {{exists p, p++X=l ∧ CurrentBid = (max p) ∧ appear in (CurrentWinner,CurrentBid) p
∧ NewBuyer = AHeadBuyer ListBP ∧ NewBid = AHeadBid ListBP
∧ (BIsCons (AId ListBP)) ∧ (BLt (AId CurrentBid) (AId newBid))}}
(8) {{exists p, p++tail X=l ∧ NewBid = (max p) ∧ appear in (NewBuyer,NewBid) p}}
CurrentBid ::= (AId NewBid)
(9) {{exists p, p++tail X=l ∧ CurrentBid = (max p) ∧ appear in (NewBuyer,CurrentBid) p}}
CurrentWinner ::= (AId NewBuyer)
(10) {{exists p, p++tail X=l ∧ CurrentBid = (max p) ∧ appear in (CurrentWinner,CurrentBid) p}}
ELSE
(11) {{exists p, p++X=l ∧ CurrentBid = (max p) ∧ appear in (CurrentWinner,CurrentBid) p
∧ NewBuyer = AHeadBuyer ListBP ∧ NewBid = AHeadBid ListBP
∧ (BIsCons (AId ListBP)) ∧ !(BLt (AId CurrentBid) (AId newBid))}}
(12) {{exists p, p++tail X=l ∧ CurrentBid = (max p) ∧ appear in (CurrentWinner,CurrentBid) p}}
SKIP
(13) {{exists p, p++tail X=l ∧ CurrentBid = (max p) ∧ appear in (CurrentWinner,CurrentBid) p}}
FI;
(14) {{exists p, p++tail X=l ∧ CurrentBid = (max p) ∧ appear in (CurrentWinner,CurrentBid) p}}
ListBP ::= ATail (AId ListBP)
(15) {{exists p, p++X=l ∧ CurrentBid = (max p) ∧ appear in (CurrentWinner,CurrentBid) p}}
END.
(16) {{exists p, p++X=l ∧ CurrentBid = (max p) ∧ appear in (CurrentWinner,CurrentBid) p
∧ !(BIsCons (AId ListBP))}}
(17) {{CurrentBid = (max l) ∧ appear in (CurrentWinner,CurrentBid) l}}
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establish Theorem 4 and Theorem 5. In the following paragraph, we have explained
the proof steps in Table 4.3.
The preconditions of this program, which is shown in line (1), are that ListBP
is a bidding list, and that all the values in ListBP are stored to another list l by
adding a default bidderpair (0,0) to the head of ListBP. All other variables in the
precondition have default value 0. The post conditions of this program are 1) the final
value of CurrentBid is the highest bid of the original list l, and 2) the bidderpair
(CurrentWinner, CurrentBid) appears in the original list l as in line (17). The
loop invariant in this proof is: exists p, p++ListBP=l ∧ CurrentBid = max p ∧
appear in (CurrentWinner,CurrentBid) p, which states that at each iteration of
the loop, the original list l is equal to the append of the current value of ListBP and
some other list p that keeps track of information from the original state. To satisfy
the loop invariant, a function named appe is defined to add the head of ListBP to the
end of p. The preconditions of the inner if-sentence in line (6), are the combinations
of loop invariant, the while guard and two equalities that are introduced from the two
assignments that are in line (8) and (9) of Table 4.2. The proof in the if-sentence is
branched as the guard holds in line (7) and not holds in line (11). Line (2) is implied
from line (1), while line (17) is implied from line (16). To indicate that the payment is
the highest bid, we just need to add an assignment Payment ::= (AId CurrentBid)
to set the value of Payment as CurrentBid. By adding another assignment Winner
::= (AId CurrentWinner), we can deduce that the winner has the highest bid. Note
that if a property is proven from within Coq, then this property holds in our OWL-S
specification since the translation from OWL-S to Coq is sound and complete.
Then, we have implemented the proof of a weakly dominant strategy in an English
auction. The definition of weakly dominant strategy is refer to Definition 2 in Sec-
tion 3.1.2. The utility of the winner in an English auction is defined as ui = vi − pi,
where pi is the payment, which is equal to the final bid of i. Other participants’ utility
is 0. There exists a dominant strategy in the English auction. The proof of this theorem
is constructed by different cases.
Theorem 6. In an English auction, bidding up to its valuation (bi ≤ vi) is a weakly
dominant strategy for an agent.
Proof. Suppose participant i’s valuation is vi and its bidding is bi. The second highest
bid in this auction is shb. There are two strategies for each participant: one is bidding
up to its valuation, i.e. bi ≤ vi; the other is bidding beyond its valuation, i.e. bi > vi.
There are two cases in this proof:
1. i wins. There are two cases in this condition.
(a) Participant i wins by using either strategy. However, the utility of bid beyond its
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valuation (bi > vi) is ui = vi− bi, which is a negative value, while the utility of the
other strategy (bi <= vi) is non-negative value.
(b) Participant i wins by using the strategy of bid beyond its valuation and its valuation
is less than the second highest bid, i.e. bi > shb > vi. The utility of i is negative
when it bids beyond its valuation, while the utility of bid up to its valuation is 0.
2. i loses. Participant i gets utility of 0 by using either strategy.
In the table of 4.4, we only display the proof sketch of case (a). It shows that if one
agent wins, the utility of bid up to its valuation is better than bid beyond its valuation,
i.e. U2 >= U1. The proof of other cases has been constructed in a similar way. In
this program, V represents the valuation, P is the payment of the winner and shb is
the second highest bid in an English auction. We start with the outer precondition in
(1) and (8). Following hoare if rule and adding the postcondition in (4) and (7), we
conjoin the precondition (1) with the guard of the conditional in the if construct to
obtain (2). Then, we conjoin (1) with the negated guard of the conditional to obtain
(5). Substitutions of U1 and U2 are used to generate (3) and (6). Finally, we deduce
(3) from (2), and deduce (6) from (5).
Table 4.4: Proof Sketch of dominant strategy in an English Auction
(1) {{fun st => True ∧ (st U1) = 0 ∧ (st U2) = 0 ∧ st V > st shb}}
IFB (BLt (AId V)(AId P)) THEN
(2) {{fun st => True ∧ (st U1) = 0 ∧ (st U2) = 0 ∧ st V > st shb ∧ st V < st P}}
(3) {{fun st => st U2 >= st (V-P)}}
(U1 ::= AMinus (AId V) (AId P))
(4) {{fun st => st U2 >= st U1}}
ELSE
(5) {{fun st => True ∧ (st U1) = 0 ∧ (st U2) = 0 ∧ st V > st shb ∧ !(st V < st P)}}
(6) {{fun st => st (V-P) >= st U1}}
(U2 ::= AMinus (AId V) (AId P))
(7) {{fun st => st U2 >= st U1}}
FI;
(8) {{fun st => st U2 >= st U1}}
In the proof shown in Table 4.4, we assume that we have already got the winner,
payment and second highest bid from an English auction. We can prove more game-
theoretic properties from within Coq. In the work [9], we have developed a Coq proof
of the well-known statement that bidding its true valuation is the dominant strategy
for each agent in a Vickrey auction. An important property that can be checked is
that the auction is a well-defined function and that it does implement its specifications
through certified code generation [23]. More challenging properties to be checked might
be that the auction mechanism is collusion-free or that it is free from fictitious bidding.
49
4.4 Related Work
There is by now a large body of literature on program transformations and their ver-
ification. For example, the researcher may be interested in translating a C code into
a Java code or vice versa. More importantly, it may have to be guaranteed that the
correctness of all compilation phases and any optimization technique used to improve
code performance for safety-critical software. This implies the verification of program
transformations from one source into a target in a possibly different programming lan-
guage, see example [61] and the references therein. Usually, the verification of these
kinds of program transformations relies upon the concept of refinement; that is the set
of behaviors of the target program is a subset of the source program. In our work,
we have translated OWL-S specifications into specifications in a Coq imperative lan-
guage by using Antlr. Our transformation is merely a one-to-one mapping between
two WHILE languages and the semantic equivalence between the source and target
specifications can be established using the relational Hoare logic in [14].
In the context of specifications translation, the work reported in [77], OWL-S was
mapped into Frame logic for using first order logic based model checking to verify
certain properties of Semantic Web Service systems. In our work, we have automated
a syntactic translation scheme that preserves the semantics of the source code so that
properties that are shown to be true or false from within Coq will stay respectively
true or false in the OWL-S paradigm.
The idea of software agents automatically checking desirable properties has been
investigated in [100, 101] by using a model checking approach. The computational
complexity of such costly verification procedures are investigated in [99]. A typed lan-
guage which allows for automatic verification that an allocation algorithm is monotonic
and therefore truthful was introduced in [60]. More recently, a proof-carrying code ap-
proach [79, 2] relying on proofs development tools to enable automatic certification of
auction mechanisms have been investigated in [9, 23]. This work aimes at bridging the
gap between the need for a machine-readable formalism to specify online auction mech-
anisms and the ability of software agents to formally verify possibly complex auction
properties.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have considered the problem of trust in a network of online auctions
by software agents. This requires software agents to understand auction protocols
and to prove some desirable properties whose correctness will give confidence in the
system. We have first discussed how OWL-S is expressive enough to be used as a
machine-readable formalism to describe these mechanisms. We have then shown how
such an OWL-S specification can be automatically translated into a Coq imperative
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program in order to enable us to develop proofs that are machine-checkable. Machine-
checkable proofs are required as we have used the proof-carrying code paradigm wherein
an auctioneer will have to provide proofs of claimed properties of its auction and buyer
agents will need to check the correctness of those proofs.
The translation from an OWL-S to a Coq imperative language code is carried
out using a one-to-one mapping between two WHILE languages and the correctness
of the transformation is based on semantics equivalence between the source and the
target codes. This semantics equivalence can be justified by using a relational Hoare
logic [14] that is sound and complete. This automatic transformation is implemented
using Antlr. Finally, we have illustrated the verification of auction properties by
developing a Coq proof of the fact that in an English auction, the highest bidder
wins the auction. In Chapter 7, we will work on the formalization and prove desirable
properties of combinatorial auctions. We cannot express combinatorial auctions in
OWL-S since those auctions involve quantification over valuation or bidding functions.
Therefore, we will rely on Coq to implement this task.
In the following chapter, we will introduce an inquiry dialogue game that integrated
FPCC to enable buyer agents to automatically communication with an auctioneer.
Buyer agents can ask questions which are properties that have been proved in this
chapter to the auctioneer, and then make their decisions whether or not to participate
in an auction according to the result of the dialogue.
51
Chapter 5
A Dialogue Game Approach to
Enable Decision Making
5.1 Introduction
We consider e-commerce scenarios wherein software agents can buy or sell goods on
behalf of their owners. To enable software agents to participate in such online trading,
the trading mechanism should be presented in a machine understandable way. The
Semantic Web provides an approach to enable agents to read and interpret a trading
mechanism as an online service for which static and dynamic information can be ex-
plicitly described using ontology languages. For example, the Web Ontology Language
(OWL) [75], which is based on description logic, can be used to express classes and re-
lationships among them. The Semantic Markup for Web Services (OWL-S) [69], which
is focused on the process description of a service, can be used to describe the proce-
dures of the trading mechanism. However, the message exchange in the architecture of
Semantic Web Services is restricted as a client-server or request-response pattern. To
extend the interactivity of the Semantic Web Services, dialogue games are introduced
to support message exchanges. By using dialogue games, agents can assert, challenge
and justify their arguments according to their knowledge [109].
Dialogue games are rule-governed interactions among software agents [73], wherein
each agent presents its ideas by making “moves” based on a set of rules. Since the com-
mon agent communication languages, such as FIPA ACL [38], lack certain locutions to
express justifications for statements, additional locutions are proposed to extend the
FIPA ACL so that argumentation can be supported in a dialogue [72]. Dialogue games
permit agents to carry out various types of interactions, such as information seeking,
inquiry, persuasion or negotiation. Agents can construct a dialogue by dynamically
adjusting the content and a sequence of utterances as the discussion ensues. In our
framework, we have used an inquiry dialogue to make two agents take turns in assert-
ing, questioning, accepting, or rejecting statements. The goal of an inquiry dialogue
is to find out whether a statement is true or false or show that there is insufficient
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evidence to accept a statement [112]. In our work, evidence can be formal proof or an
informal statement (e.g., statistical evidence) for a desirable property of the trading
mechanism. An example of a desirable property of an auction mechanism could be
that the highest buyer wins or that bidding its true valuation is the optimal strategy
for a buyer. Formal proofs are constructed using the Coq [34] theorem prover within
the PCC (Proof-Carrying Code) paradigm [80]. In our online auction scenario, PCC
enables the auctioneer to develop proofs for properties of interest and the buyer to
check the correctness of a given proof [9]. By considering the set of evidences collected
in a dialogue for a set of desirable properties, a buyer agent as a service consumer can
evaluate the quality of a service and make decision as to whether to enter or leave a
service.
On the one hand, in the language architecture of Semantic Web [49], each language
in the above layer extends the capabilities of the layer below, as shown in Figure 2.1.
For example, OWL extends RDFS by providing more semantic features like cardinality,
union, intersection and more reasoning possibilities. The top two layers in this semantic
web stack are the Proof and Trust layers. In essence, proofs can be constructed so
as to increase trustworthiness in the system. However, the current system does not
support yet a proof construction or procedure for building up trust. On the other
hand, Interactive Theorem Proving provides an approach to develop formal proof by
man-machine collaboration. It is an important approach which using formal methods
to verify the correctness of a protocol or a mathematical statement. In an Interactive
Theorem Prover (ITP), human can create definitions, theorems and generate proofs
using an interactive proof editor. The ITP also supports automatic checking of proofs.
In our work, we use Coq [34], which is an ITP, to generate and check the proofs of
desirable properties of an online auction.
The contributions of this chapter are three-fold:
• We have integrated dialogue games within the PCC paradigm so as to increase
trust in an agents-mediated online auction. As a consequence, we have extended
the interactivity of agent communication wherein formal proofs can be used as
arguments in a dialogue.
• Since, not all desirable properties of an online auction mechanism will have asso-
ciated formal proofs, we have allowed for informal or empirical evidence related
to the QoS (Quality of Service). For example, an auctioneer may claim that it
does not have a proof that its mechanism is free from cheating, but 98% of its
consumers never complained about being cheated. We have designed a dialogue
game wherein formal and informal evidence can be used as arguments.
• We have constructed a decision model over the formal and empirical evidences
allowing a buyer agent, with predefined expectations, to decide whether to join
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or not an auction.
The proposed dialogue game framework is implemented in JADE [12], which is a widely
used tool to implement multi-agent systems. It provides mechanisms to create agents,
enable agents to execute tasks and make agents communicate with each other.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In section 5.2, we will intro-
duce the technique of Semantic Web Service and give an example of an English auction
which is written in the language of OWL-S. The proposed dialogue game framework
is presented in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, we present an example that implements
our dialogue game framework, and is then evaluated in Section 5.5. Related work is
presented in Section 5.6, before summary in Section 5.7.
5.2 Ontologies for Services
The Semantic Web [15] not only enables greater access to content but also to services
on the Web. Semantic Web Service is a technology that combines Semantic Web and
Web services to develop new Web applications. Web services technology is based on a
set of standard protocols such as UDDI (Universal Description, Discovery and Integra-
tion), SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol), and WSDL (Web Services Description
Language). However, these standards do not support automated Web services. To
improve the automatic properties of Web services, Semantic Web Services (SWS) are
created [26]. OWL-S [69] and WSMO [32] are two standards for the SWS technol-
ogy. OWL-S is composed of three main parts: the service profile for advertising and
discovering services; the process model, which gives a detailed description of a service
operation; and the grounding, which provides details on how to interoperate with a
service via messages. WSMO (Web Service Modeling Ontology) provides a concep-
tual framework for semantically describing all relevant aspects of Web services in order
to facilitate the automation of discovering, combining and invoking electronic services
over the Web. WSMO comprises four main elements: ontologies, which provide the
terminology used by other WSMO elements; Web service descriptions, which describe
the functional and behavioral aspects of a Web service; goals that represent the user’s
desires; and mediators, which aim at automatically handling interoperability problems
between different WSMO elements. Current SWS technique can help us build a system
that enables agents to publish, discover and invoke services in an open environment
(the Internet).
5.2.1 A Scenario: An English Auction
In our work, we use OWL-S to build up the Web service. OWL-S can be used together
with other Semantic Web languages, such as OWL DL [75] and SWRL [50], to describe
the properties and capabilities of a Web service in unambiguous, computer-interpretable
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Figure 5.1: A Fragment of the Auction Ontology
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form. To set up a Semantic Web Service, the first step is to build the ontology of
the specific area. The ontology can be used to formally describe the semantics of
terms representing an area of knowledge and give explicit meaning to the information.
This enables automated reasoning, semantic search and knowledge management of the
specific area. For example, the ontology of auction domain can contain the constructs
of classes, relations, axioms, individuals and assertions. We give a fragment of the
auction ontology in Figure 5.1. The auction domain ontology not only defines basic
information of an agent (e.g., bid, valuation, strategy); but also the preference of an
agent. These preferences can be used to help agents make decisions during a trading
dialogue. The following code illustrates the ontology about a question named Q1. Q1
has three object properties which are hasContent, hasPreference, hasType and one data
property with name hasWeight.
<ClassAssertion>
<Class IRI="#QuestionID"/>
<NamedIndividual IRI="#Q1"/>
</ClassAssertion>
<ObjectPropertyAssertion>
<ObjectProperty IRI="#hasContent"/>
<NamedIndividual IRI="#Q1"/>
<NamedIndividual IRI="#Can_you_prove_that_payment_is_the_highest_bid"/>
</ObjectPropertyAssertion>
<ObjectPropertyAssertion>
<ObjectProperty IRI="#hasPreference"/>
<NamedIndividual IRI="#Q1"/>
<NamedIndividual IRI="#strong"/>
</ObjectPropertyAssertion>
<ObjectPropertyAssertion>
<ObjectProperty IRI="#hasType"/>
<NamedIndividual IRI="#Q1"/>
<NamedIndividual IRI="#FormalProperty"/>
</ObjectPropertyAssertion>
<DataPropertyAssertion>
<DataProperty IRI="#hasWeight"/>
<NamedIndividual IRI="#Q1"/>
<Literal datatypeIRI="&xsd;double">0.5</Literal>
</DataPropertyAssertion>
After the construction of domain ontology, the auction mechanism should be de-
scribed using the OWL-S ontology. In such a trading mechanism, functional description
should be defined: inputs, outputs, preconditions and results (IOPEs). The inputs are
the objects that should be provided to invoke the service; the outputs are the objects
that the service produces; the preconditions are the propositions that should be true
prior to service invocation; and the results consist of effects and outputs. The following
code is an example showing that, the precondition for running an auction is that at
least one agent must have some bid.
<process:hasPrecondition>
<expr:SWRL-Condition>
<expr:expressionObject>
<swrl:AtomList>
<rdf:first>
<swrl:DatavaluedPropertyAtom>
56
<swrl:propertyPredicate rdf:resource="&mybid;#hasBid"/>
<swrl:argument1 rdf:resource="&this;#agent"/>
<swrl:argument2 rdf:resource="&this;#abid"/>
</swrl:DatavaluedPropertyAtom>
</rdf:first>
<rdf:rest rdf:resource="&rdf;#nil"/>
</swrl:AtomList>
</expr:expressionObject>
</expr:SWRL-Condition>
</process:hasPrecondition>
In OWL-S, a process represents a specification of the means a buyer uses to interact
with a service. In our scenario, we use two kinds of processes: one is atomic process,
which corresponds to a single interchange of a request message and a response message;
the other is composite process, which consists of a series of processes linked together
by control flows and data flows. The control flow describes the relations between the
executions of different sub-processes. The control constructs include sequence, split,
if-then-else and iterate etc. Data flow specifies how information is transferred from one
process to another process. In our example of an English auction, we can define one
if-then-else branch to describe that when a new bid is greater than current bid (a local
variable), we update the value of current bid with the new bid. This process can be
simply described as follows.
<process:CompositeProcess>
<process:composedOf>
<process:If-Then-Else rdf:ID="CompareBid">
<process:ifCondition>
<expr:SWRL-Condition>
swrlb:lessThan(#currentBid,#newBid)
</expr:SWRL-Condition>
</process:ifCondition>
<process:then>
<!-- Update the value of #currentBid -->
...
</process:then>
<process:else>
<!-- Keep the value of #currentBid as usual-->
...
</process:else>
</process:If-Then-Else>
</process:composedOf>
</process:CompositeProcess>
In our setting, we consider the scenario that buyers communicate with the seller
to decide whether or not to join an online auction. Therefore, we do not need to
define the grounding of the service. OWL-S can be used to build complex business
solutions by describing the functional, non-functional properties of a service, so that
agents can perform automatic reasoning on these descriptions. Dialogue games, which
can help software agents interact rationally by providing support or counterexample
for a conclusion, make this reasoning more flexible for greater interaction between an
auctioneer and a buyer.
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5.3 Our Dialogue Game Framework
Online auction web sites, such as eBay, have attracted millions of users around the
world to sell, bid and buy goods. In our specific scenario, software agents are assumed
to be capable of buying or selling goods through online auction houses. In this scenario,
how can buyer agents choose the appropriate auction house? A buyer agent will have
properties of interest. These properties need to be kept in the auction mechanism for
the agent to join, bid, and buy items. Our framework is aimed at enabling a potential
buyer (e.g., software agent) to interact with the auctioneer before deciding whether
or not to join the auction. These interactions between the auctioneer and a buyer are
carried out within a dialogue game wherein the buyer agent can query whether desirable
properties hold and request associated evidences. To enable trust, the auctioneer uses
the PCC (Proof-Carrying code) paradigm to convince buyers that a service has some
desirable properties, as shown in our previous work [9, 8]. This enables the auctioneer to
specify and to develop formal proofs for those properties. Then, the buyer uses a proof
checker to check that a given proof of a well specified property of the auction is correct.
Besides, a buyer can object to the auctioneer under the condition that a counterexample
is found by the proof checker. Thus, trust can be established between an auctioneer and
a buyer. In our PCC implementation [9], we have used the theorem prover Coq [34]
to develop the proofs of desirable properties. This is achieved by translating OWL-S
descriptions into Coq specifications [7], and then uses Coq’s machinery to specify and
prove a property of interest. On the buyer side, we have used the Coq proof checker so
that a buyer can automatically check that a claimed property by the auctioneer holds
in the system. Figure 3.1 illustrates our PCC implementation in this setting.
We have integrated the PCC paradigm within our dialogue model as illustrated by
the framework in Figure 5.2. In this framework, both the auctioneer and the buyer
share the same question ontology for general online auction services. The auctioneer
holds an OWL-S ontology which provides a machine understandable description of the
auction mechanism. Evidence for a claimed property may have an informal or formal
justification. Informal justification relies upon data collected by the service. In the case
of properties with formal proofs, the related specification of the OWL-S description can
be translated into Coq specifications so that proofs of these properties can be developed
from within Coq. This kind of sound language translation is described in our previous
work [7]. The proof certificates for the established desirable properties are local to the
auctioneer. This strengthens the interactivity between a buyer and an auctioneer and
reduces knowledge disclosing. The proofs will be disclosed to a buyer when related
questions are proposed in a dialogue game. The dialogue game is used to enable a
buyer agent to find out about properties and certificates. This dialogue is a two-person
game, which means that only one buyer can communicate with the auctioneer at a
time.
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Figure 5.2: The dialectical approach framework. A buyer agent uses a dialogue to
communicate with the auctioneer and the checking of proofs of desirable properties can
be integrated within the dialogue using PCC paradigm.
5.3.1 The Formal Dialogue Model
The proposed inquiry dialogue consists of a number of locutions or moves, pre-conditions
that indicate the rules that must be satisfied before a move, and the post-conditions
that describe the actions that will occur after a move. We have restricted the number of
participants in the inquiry dialogue to two. Let P be the participants in the dialogue.
A participant is either a sender or a recipient.
A dialogue D is simply defined by a sequence of moves between the participants.
One move represents a message exchange made from one participant to the other. As
the dialogue progresses, each move is indexed by a timepoint, which is denoted by a
natural number, and only one move can be made at each timepoint. In our inquiry
dialogue model, seven types of moves are defined. They are open, assert, question,
justify, accept, reject and close, and the type of each legal move should be one of them.
Definition 4. A dialogue, denoted D, is a sequence of moves [mr, ...,mt], where
r, t ∈ N, r < t, involving two participants Pi ∈ P, i = {1, 2}, such that:
1. the first move of the dialogue, mr is of type open,
2. the last move of the dialogue, mt is of type close,
3. Sender(ms) ∈ P (r ≤ s ≤ t)
4. Sender(ms) 6= Sender(ms+1)(r ≤ s < t)
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Figure 5.3: The state diagram of the dialogue. Nodes indicate the agent whose turn is
to utter a move. Moves uttered by the auctioneer are labeled with a dashed line, while
those uttered by the buyer are labelled with a solid line.
The first move of a dialogue D must always be an open move (condition 1), while
the last move should be a close move (condition 2). Each move of the dialogue must
be performed by a participant of the dialogue (condition 3). Finally, participants take
turns to make moves (condition 4).
The dialogue assumes that each participant holds a commitment store that records
its statements in a dialogue. The commitment store of participant Pi is defined as
a private-write, public-read record containing all the commitments incurred by Pi.
Both of the participants can read the commitment store of Pi, but the content of this
commitment store can only be written using the moves made by Pi.
Definition 5. A commitment store is a set of beliefs denoted as CStx, where x ∈ P
is an agent and t ∈ N is a timepoint.
The commitment store of Pi is created when the agent enters into a dialogue and
persists until the dialogue terminates.
Definition 6. A proof is an argument from hypotheses to a conclusion and each step
of the argument follows the laws of logic.
The state diagram of the dialogue is given in Figure 5.3. A buyer can open a
dialogue by using the open move. Then, the auctioneer can give an assertion to the
buyer. The buyer can choose to close the dialogue on the condition that he does not
have any issues to raise with the auctioneer. Otherwise, the buyer can give a move
of type question to query on the issues that he is concerned about. The auctioneer
must give a justification to the buyer for each specific question. There are three cases
in the justification process: 1) the auctioneer has a formal proof for the answer to
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the question at hand; 2) the auctioneer has an informal evidence for the answer; or
3) the auctioneer does not know the answer for the question. In the first case, the
buyer will use the PCC paradigm to check the correctness of the formal proof, if this
proof is certified, then the buyer gives an accept move, otherwise, the proof checker will
generate a counterexample and deny the property that related to the question, then the
buyer make the move of reject. In the second case, the buyer will compare the informal
evidence with a reasonable expected value for the issue of interest and will accept it
with some score. In the last case, the buyer will give a reject move to the auctioneer.
The auctioneer can give assertions to the buyer, so that the dialogue can carry on until
both participants agreed to close the dialogue.
The components of a dialogue include:
• ∑: The knowledge base, or beliefs of each agent.
• CS ∈ ∑: an agent’s commitment store that refers to the statements that have
been made in the dialogue.
• a: auctioneer.
• b: buyer.
• x: either auctioneer or buyer.
• ρ: the last sender in the current dialogue.
The locutions used in the dialogue model are defined as follows.
Definition 7. open(b): buyer b opens a dialogue.
• Pre-conditions:
1. b /∈ P , where P is the set of dialogue participants.
• Post-conditions:
1. P ′ = P ∪ {b}
2. CSb = ∅
3. ρ = b
A buyer b can open a dialogue. The precondition of this locution is that the buyer
is not a participant of this dialogue. The postcondition is that buyer b becomes a
participant of the dialogue (post-condition 1) and his commitment store is created
(post-condition 2).
Definition 8. assert(a, b, φ): auctioneer a gives an assertion to the buyer.
• Pre-conditions:
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1. a 6= ρ
2. locutiontype(ls−1) ∈ {open, accept, reject}
3. φ ∈ Σa
• Post-conditions:
1. CSa
′
= {φ} ∪ CSa
2. ρ = a
The auctioneer should not have uttered the previous move (pre-condition 1). The
assert move should be given under the conditions that a buyer has open a dialogue,
the justification is accepted or rejected by the buyer (pre-condition 2). A belief φ from
the beliefs store of the auctioneer will be asserted by the auctioneer to ask the buyer
to propose a question (pre-condition 3). Once the assert has been uttered, the belief φ
will be added to the commitment store of the auctioneer (post-condition 1).
Definition 9. question(b, a, φ): buyer b asks a question about property φ to the auc-
tioneer a.
• Pre-conditions:
1. b 6= ρ
2. locutiontype(ls−1) ∈ {assert}
3. φ /∈ Σb
4. φ /∈ CSb
• Post-conditions:
1. φ /∈ Σb
2. φ ∈ CSb
3. ρ = b
A buyer can ask questions to the auctioneer after the auctioneer has uttered an
assertion (pre-conditions 1 and 2). The property φ does not contain the knowledge base
of b (pre-condition 3) and the buyer has not proposed questions about this property
(pre-condition 4). Once b has uttered the question, the knowledge base of b does not
change (post-condition 1), and the commitment store of b has been updated (post-
condition 2).
Definition 10. justify(a, b, φ): auctioneer a justifies the property φ for buyer b.
• Pre-conditions:
1. a 6= ρ
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2. locutiontype(ls−1) ∈ {question}
3. φ ∈ CSb
4. φ /∈ Σb
• Post-conditions:
1. φ /∈ Σb
2. φ ∈ CSa
3. ρ = a
After receiving a question about property φ (pre-condition 2 & 3), the auctioneer
a should provide a justification to this property. The knowledge base of the buyer and
commitment store remains the same in this move (post-condition 1). The justification
of this property is added to the commitment store of the auctioneer (post-condition 2).
Definition 11. accept(b, a, φ): buyer b accepts the justification of property φ .
• Pre-conditions:
1. b 6= ρ
2. locutiontype(ls−1) ∈ {justify}
3. φ /∈ Σb
4. φ ∈ CSa
• Post-conditions:
1. φ ∈ Σb
2. φ ∈ CSa
3. ρ = b
The accept move is used to accept the justification for property φ in the preceding
justify move (pre-condition 2). The property φ is not contained in the knowledge base of
the buyer before the move of accept (pre-condition 3), and the auctioneer has provided
the justification for this property (pre-condition 4). Property φ becomes the element
of the knowledge base of b after this move (post-condition 1). The commitment store
of a does not change in the move of accept (post-condition 2).
Definition 12. reject(b, a, φatt, φ): buyer b rejects the property φ using φatt .
• Pre-conditions:
1. b 6= ρ
2. locutiontype(ls−1) ∈ {justify}
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3. attack(φatt, φ)
4. φ /∈ Σb
5. φ ∈ CSa
• Post-conditions:
1. φ /∈ Σb
2. φ ∈ CSa
3. ρ = b
Buyer can raise an rejection by giving an evidence φatt to previously declared prop-
erty φ in response to the move justify (pre-condition 2). There is an evidence φatt which
attacks φ (pre-condition 3). The knowledge base of b and commitment store of a does
not change (pre-condition 4 & 5 and post-condition 1 & 2).
Definition 13. close(p): participant p closes a dialogue.
• Pre-conditions:
1. p 6= ρ
2. locutiontype(ls−1) ∈ {assert, close}
3. ∀φ ∈ Σb, φ ∈ CSb
• Post-conditions:
1. if matched-close P = ∅
The participant can only close a dialogue after an assert or close (pre-condition 2).
The buyer chooses to close the dialogue when all the questions in his knowledge base
have been proposed (pre-condition 3). When both participants have agreed to close
the dialogue, they will be removed from the dialogue (post-condition 1).
5.3.2 Decision Model and Processes of the Dialogue
In our setting, both the auctioneer and the buyer agents share the same knowledge
base, which includes the ontologies of the online auction and related specifications.
Both agents can understand each other’s messages but have a private knowledge base.
The set of questions are private to the buyer and the set of answers associated to
the questions are private to the auctioneer. However, when a question or answer is
proposed, it becomes public to both participants. Each question is associated with a
preference level, which determines the order in which the questions are proposed by
the buyer. The preference level E = {strong, average, weak} is then used to drive the
dialogue forward.
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A Weighted Sum model is used in the dialogue game. The output of the Weighted
Sum model is a binary set of O, whose elements are {Y es,No}. Decision is made by
evaluating a bunch of properties, which are represented as the set of H. We assume
that every property is bind with a score si and a relative weight wi, which indicates the
importance of a property. The value of si is determined by a function which depends
on the type of evidence provided. If we have formal evidence, then the scoring function
will return either negative value in the case of the proof cannot be accepted by the
proof-checker or a full score otherwise. If the evidence is empirical, then the scoring
function is in the form of intervals, see Section 5.4 for more details. It is the usual
practice to set the summation of weights to 1 in the weighted sum model, such that∑n
i=1wi = 1 wherein n is the number of elements in H [33]. The final score fs is
calculated as follows:
fs =
n∑
i=1
wisi
, where n is also the number of elements in H.
The buyer has a reasonable expectation in the form of an admissibility threshold ε
beyond which the final score will lead the buyer to join the auction. In other words, if
fs ≥ ε, then the buyer will choose Y es to join the auction at hand. The threshold ε
may come from experience or be derived from historical data.
Algorithm 1 The processes of an inquiry dialogue
1: buyer opens an inquiry dialogue uses an open move
2: auctioneer gives an assert to ask buyer to propose a question
3: while buyer has question(s) that has(have) not been proposed do
4: buyer selects a question which with the highest preference level
5: buyer asks this question using the move whose type is question
6: auctioneer gives a justification using the move whose type is of justify
7: if the justification is unknown or has failed to be checked then
8: buyer gives a reject move
9: else
10: buyer gives an accept move
11: end if
12: auctioneer gives an assert to ask buyer to propose a question
13: end while
14: buyer gives a close move
15: auctioneer gives a close move to terminate the dialogue
The inquiry dialogue is described by Algorithm 1. A dialogue starts with a move
opening an inquiry dialogue, that has a matched-close to terminate the dialogue and
whose moves conform to the rules for each locution described in Section 5.3.1. The
buyer starts an inquiry dialogue by giving an open move, then the auctioneer propose
an assert move to ask buyer to propose questions. The buyer chooses an unproposed
question which with the highest preference level from his knowledge base and then uses
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the move of question to propose it. After receiving a question, the auctioneer should
respond by a justify move. If the content of a justification is unknown, or a formal proof
that is failed to be checked. The buyer will give a reject move, otherwise he should
accepts the justification use an accept move. The auctioneer should give an assertion
to ask buyer to propose a new question in the end of the loop. A dialogue can be closed
when both of the participants agree to terminate it. All of the proposed questions and
related justifications are stored in the commitment store of the dialogue. Besides, each
question can only be asked once.
5.4 Inquiry Dialogue Example
We have illustrated the proposed inquiry dialogue by means of an example where a
buyer talks to an auctioneer to decide whether or not to join an online auction service.
Table 5.1: Questions in the shared ontology
QuestionID hasType hasContent
Q1 FormalProperty Can you prove that the payment
is the highest bid?
Q2 FunctionalProperty What’s the payment method?
Q3 FunctionalProperty What’s the delivery company
for your product?
Q4 FunctionalProperty What’s the Input of the service?
Q5 nonFunctionalProperty What’s the Reputation of your service?
Q6 nonFunctionalProperty What’s the ResponseTime of your service?
Q7 FormalProperty Can you prove that the winner
has the highest bid?
The shared question ontology contains three types of questions: 1) questions about
those properties whose answers could be formal proofs of a service; 2) questions about
the functional properties (e.g. inner operation of a service) of a service; and 3) questions
about the non-functional properties (e.g. QoS) of a service. In this example, seven
questions are proposed as listed in Table 5.1.
In Table 5.1, each question is marked by an ID, and the related type and content of
each question are defined use the OWL objectProperty relationship. Users can extend
this ontology by adding questions as the classification of types.
The buyer holds a private knowledge base that contains the questions he wants to
inquire the dialogue. The preference level and weight of each question are shown in
Table 5.2. As mentioned above the buyer will choose the questions in order on the basis
of the preference level and calculate the scores of the justifications using the variable
of weight, w. The summation of all the weights in this table equals to one.
The auctioneer uses Table 5.3 to search for the answers for each query, a buyer can
not directly visit this table unless he queries the auctioneer. All the questions in the
shared ontology should be contained in this table, though there may exist questions
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Table 5.2: Questions in the knowledge base of the buyer
QuestionID Preference Weight hasContent
Level (w)
Q1 strong 0.3 Can you prove that the payment
is the highest bid?
Q2 average 0.15 What’s the payment method?
Q3 weak 0.1 What’s the delivery company
for your product?
Q5 strong 0.2 What’s the Reputation of your service?
Q6 average 0.15 What’s the ResponseTime of your service?
Q7 weak 0.1 Can you prove that the winner
has the highest bid?
Table 5.3: Justifications of questions hold by the auctioneer
QuestionID hasContent Justification
Q1 Can you prove that the payment
is the highest bid? FormalProof PEquHB
Q2 What’s the payment method? Visa DEBIT
Q3 What’s the delivery company
for your product? DHL
Q4 What’s the Input of the service? BuyerID & Bid
Q5 What’s the Reputation of your service? 0.85
Q6 What’s the ResponseTime of your service? unknown
Q7 Can you prove that the winner
has the highest bid? FormalProof WhasHB
that do not have related answers. Table 5.4 shows the grading standards of the buyer
for the justifications. The highest score for each question is 100, the lowest score for the
formal question is -50 when the proof provided by the auctioneer is failed to check, and
the lowest score other questions is 0. As this grading table is subjective, a buyer can
grade the justification based on his own preference. However, for the question whose
justification is a formal proof, the buyer should give full marks to it when the proof is
successfully checked.
An example dialogue between buyer and auctioneer is presented as in Figure 5.4.
The turn order in the above dialogue is deterministic, the buyer should open a dialogue
in Move 1. Then the auctioneer and buyer give assertions one by one.
Moves 2-5: The auctioneer asks buyer to ask a question. The buyer searches in his
knowledge base of questions and find out a question that with the highest preference,
which is Q1. Then the auctioneer searches the justification for the question from
Table 5.3. This justification is a formal proof, so the auctioneer should send the address
of a proof checker (in the case that the buyer does not have the proof checker) and
related proof files to the buyer. The buyer then downloads and uses the proof checker
to check the correctness of the proof, and gets positive feedback. Finally, the buyer
accepts the justification.
Moves 6-9: The auctioneer asks buyer to ask another question. The buyer finds
question Q5, which has the highest preference level within the remaining questions.
67
Table 5.4: Grading Table of the buyer
QuestionID Justification Score
Q1 Formal Proof Successes 100
Formal Proof Fails -50
Do Not Have Formal Proof 0
Q2 Alipay 100
Visa DEBIT 80
Bank Cards 50
Others 0
Q3 SF EXPRESS 100
DHL 80
EMS 70
Others 0
Q5 [0.90,1.00] 100
[0.70,0.90) 80
[0.50,0.70) 50
[0.00,0.50) 0
unknown 0
Q6 (0.00ns,0.03ns) 100
[0.03ns,0.05ns) 80
[0.05ns,0.10ns) 50
[0.05ns,+∞) 0
unknown 0
Q7 Formal Proof Successes 100
Formal Proof Fails -50
Do Not Have Formal Proof 0
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(1) buyer → auctioneer : open(buyer)
(2) auctioneer → buyer : assert(auctioneer, buyer, You can ask a question.)
(3) buyer → auctioneer : question(buyer,auctioneer,Q1)
(4) auctioneer → buyer : justify(auctioneer,buyer,FormalProof PEquHB)
(In the justification process, the auctioneer sends the proof to the buyer and the proof is successfully
checked by using the COQ proof checker.)
(5) buyer → auctioneer : accept(buyer,auctioneer,FormalProof PEquHB)
(6) auctioneer → buyer : assert(auctioneer, buyer, You can ask a question.)
(7) buyer → auctioneer : question(buyer,auctioneer,Q5)
(8) auctioneer → buyer : justify(auctioneer,buyer,0.85)
(9) buyer → auctioneer : accept(buyer,auctioneer,0.85)
(10) auctioneer → buyer : assert(auctioneer, buyer, You can ask a question.)
(11) buyer → auctioneer : question(buyer,auctioneer,Q2)
(12) auctioneer → buyer : justify(auctioneer,buyer,Visa DEBIT)
(13) buyer → auctioneer : accept(buyer,auctioneer, Visa DEBIT)
(14) auctioneer → buyer : assert(auctioneer, buyer, You can ask a question.)
(15) buyer → auctioneer : question(buyer,auctioneer,Q6)
(16) auctioneer → buyer : justify(auctioneer,buyer, unknown)
(17) buyer → auctioneer : reject(buyer,auctioneer, unknown)
(18) auctioneer → buyer : assert(auctioneer, buyer, You can ask a question.)
(19) buyer → auctioneer : question(buyer,auctioneer,Q3)
(20) auctioneer → buyer : justify(auctioneer,buyer, DHL)
(21) buyer → auctioneer : accept(buyer,auctioneer,DHL)
(22) auctioneer → buyer : assert(auctioneer, buyer, You can ask a question.)
(23) buyer → auctioneer : question(buyer,auctioneer,Q7)
(24) auctioneer → buyer : justify(auctioneer,buyer,FormalProof WhasHB)
(In the justification process, the auctioneer sends the proof to the buyer. The buyer failed to checked
the proof by using the COQ proof checker, which means the proof provided by the auctioneer is wrong.
The buyer finds an attack to this property.)
(25) buyer → auctioneer : reject(buyer,auctioneer,FormalProof WhasHB)
(26) auctioneer → buyer : assert(auctioneer, buyer, You can ask a question.)
(27) buyer → auctioneer : close(buyer)
(28) auctioneer → buyer : close(auctioneer)
Figure 5.4: An example of the inquiry dialogue
The auctioneer gives the justification with value 0.85 and buyer accepts it.
Moves 10-13: After the auctioneer requests the buyer to ask a question. The
buyer proposes question Q2 and receives the justification with value of Visa DEBIT.
The buyer accepts the justification in this round.
Moves 14-17: In this round, the buyer raises question Q6, the auctioneer does
not have a justification for this question, so the content of this justification becomes
unknown. Then the buyer rejects this justification.
Moves 18-21: The buyer proposes another question in his knowledge base and
accepts the justification that is given by the auctioneer.
Moves 22-25: The auctioneer asks buyer to ask a question. The buyer proposes
the last question from his knowledge base, which is Q7. Then the auctioneer sends the
proof to the buyer. The buyer uses the proof checker to check the correctness of the
proof and gets a counterexample, which means the proof provided by the auctioneer
is wrong. In this case, the buyer finds an attack of this property. Finally, the buyer
rejects the justification.
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Moves 26-28: The auctioneer asks the buyer to propose a new question. However,
all the questions in the buyer ’s knowledge base have been raised. The buyer chooses
to close the dialogue and the auctioneer agrees to close the dialogue.
After the termination of the dialogue, the buyer calculates the scores for each jus-
tification. The final score fs is calculated as: fs = 0.3 ∗ 100 + 0.15 ∗ 80 + 0.1 ∗ 80 + 0.2 ∗
80 + 0.15 ∗ 0 + 0.1 ∗ (−50) = 61. We assume that the admissibility threshold, ε, of the
buyer is 70. As fs < ε, the buyer decides to not join the auction house.
5.5 Empirical Evaluation
We have implemented the proposed dialogue model in the JADE platform. We have
added the proposed locutions to the original FIPA ACL messages, so that the original
methods (e.g. addReceiver) can be called directly. The pre/postconditions of each locu-
tion are hard-coded in the program to detect the state of a dialogue. The combination
rules which are illustrated in Figure 5.3, are implemented using the behaviour control
mechanisms of JADE. When a buyer needs to check a proof, the program will use a
command to call the external software Coq and check the correctness of a proof. In
our dialogue model, only two participants are allowed.
Table 5.5: Decision making for different auction services
AuctioneerID Q1 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q6 Total Decision
(w = 0.35) (w = 0.15) (w = 0.1) (w = 0.25) (w = 0.15) Score (ε = 70)
A1 100 100 80 100 80 95 Y
A2 0 50 70 80 0 34.5 N
A3 100 50 80 80 100 85.5 Y
A4 -50 80 100 50 50 24.5 N
A5 100 50 70 50 50 69 N
In the experiment, there were five different auctioneers, from A1 to A5, which is
shown in the first column of Table 5.5. Each of the auctioneers holds an auction service.
A buyer dialogues with each of them based on the questions {Q1, Q2, Q3, Q5, Q6}. This
table shows the grades given for each questions as well as the total scores, the grading
is based on Table 5.4. For the auction hold by A1, because the value of the total score
is greater than the admissibility threshold, ε, whose value is 70, the buyer decides to
join this auction after the dialogue. For A4, the score for Q1 is -50 which means that
the result of the proof check failed. This table shows that a buyer can make decisions
for different auction services on the basis of the same questions and grading system
through dialogues.
Table 5.6 shows the result of our second experiment. We kept the value of final
scores (the second column) of each service the same as in Table 5.5. Then, by changing
the admissibility threshold from 60 to 100, the number of services that are rejected has
increased. The value of ε reflects the subjective belief of a buyer. If the buyer has
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Table 5.6: Decision making for different auction services with different admissibility
threshold
AuctioneerID Total Decision Decision Decision Decision Decision
Score (ε = 60) (ε = 70) (ε = 80) (ε = 90) (ε = 100)
A1 95 Y Y Y Y N
A2 34.5 N N N N N
A3 85.5 Y Y Y N N
A4 24.5 N N N N N
A5 69 Y N N N N
higher expectations from the service, then the value of ε will be higher.
In the third experiment, we assume that there is only one auctioneer and three
questions (Q1, Q2 and Q5). There are three buyers (B1, B2 and B3) whose weights for
each question are different. We use the same grading Table 5.4 to score each question
as in the previous experiments. The admissibility threshold of all buyers is set to 70.
The last column shows that B2 and B3 choose to join the auction while B1 refused
to. Table 5.7 shows that, even if each buyer gets the same justification from the same
auctioneer and they have the same admissibility threshold, the weights of questions can
influence the result of the decision making.
Table 5.7: Decision making for the same auction service with different weight
Q1(w = 0.20) Q2(w = 0.50) Q5(w = 0.30) Total Score Decision (ε = 70)
B1 100 50 80 69 N
Q1(w = 0.30) Q2(w = 0.50) Q5(w = 0.20) Total Score Decision (ε = 70)
B2 100 50 80 71 Y
Q1(w = 0.40) Q2(w = 0.35) Q5(w = 0.25) Total Score Decision (ε = 70)
B3 100 50 80 77.5 Y
The protocol proposed in this chapter satisfied a set of desiderata [74].
• Stated dialogue purpose: The purpose of the dialogue is to enable buyer agents
to make decision by querying the auctioneer. All participants are aware of this
purpose before they enter in the dialogue.
• Diversity of individual purposes: The dialogue model lets agents achieve their
own purposes in terms of inquiry with peers.
• Inclusiveness: There is no elimination of agents.
• Transparency : The protocol syntax and semantics are public and available to all
participants, along with the combination rules of locutions.
• Fairness: The locutions and protocol are the same for all participants, which
means that no agents have any privileges in the society.
• Rule-consistency : All protocol rules are consistent with the syntax and semantics.
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• Separation of Syntax and semantics: The syntax and semantic of the proposed
locutions are separately defined.
• Encouragement of resolution: The dialogue will terminate based on the dialogue
driven algorithm and termination rules.
• Discouragement of disruption: The commitment rules preclude disruptive be-
haviours. For example, the buyer agent cannot ask the same question more than
once.
• System simplicity : There are seven locutions in this model. Only a set of locutions
are permitted to utter in each stage of the dialogue. Agents take turns to make
locutions in bipartite dialogues.
• Computational Simplicity : In our dialogue system, we use the Coq proof checker
to check a proof, which reduces the complexity compared to generate a proof.
The length of the dialogue resulting from the protocol is: 1 + 4|H|+ 3, where |H|
is the number of questions in the knowledge base of a buyer.
5.6 Related Work
The formal study of human argument and dialogue has been proposed for modeling
agent interactions for more than a decade [73]. In the seminal work of [112], a typology
of primary dialogue types has been provided to model human dialogues. Dialogues are
categorized as six primary types: Information-seeking Dialogues (where participants
aim to exchange knowledge); Inquiry Dialogues (where participants aim to find or
destroy a proof of hypothesis); Persuasion Dialogues (where participants aim to resolve
conflicts of opinions); Negotiation Dialogues (where participants aim to make a deal on
the conflicts of interests); Deliberation Dialogues (where participants aim to decide best
available course of action) and Eristic Dialogues (where participants quarrel verbally
that aim to vent grievances). Most of the dialogues among humans or agents may
involve mixtures of these dialogue types, which are called embedded.
In formal dialogue games, players interact with each other by making utterances
according to previously defined rules. In the work of McBurrney and Parsons [71], five
dialogue game rules have been identified. These rules include: Commencement Rules
which define the circumstance under which the dialogue commences; Locutions, which
define the rules that indicate what are permitted; Combination Rules, which define
the contexts under which particular locutions are permitted or not; Commitments,
which define the rules that indicate the circumstances under which participants express
commitment to a proposition; and Termination Rules, which define the circumstances
under which the dialogue ends. FIPA ACL [38] is a standard language for agents
to communicate in. FIPA ACL contains 22 locutions (e.g. inform, request, refuse
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and agree) which make agents share knowledge and negotiate contracts. However,
FIPA ACL does not support argumentation statements. A protocol named Fatio with
five locutions (assert, question, challenge, justify and retract) has been proposed for
argumentation by [72]. In our work, we have presented a dialogue model, which is
in accordance with the rules for a dialogue game. The difference between our work
and the protocol of Fatio is that we focus on the type of inquiry dialogue. In [18], a
formal inquiry dialogue system based on Defeasible Logic Programming [40] has been
presented. In this inquiry dialogue system, three locutions open, assert and close are
defined for generating dialogues. Besides, they also define an exhaustive strategy to
decide which move to make. We defined our inquiry dialogue by adding more locutions
to the model and we also introduced the idea of attack to enable agents to reject
unsatisfied justifications. In the work of [85], an inquiry dialogue has been proposed to
enable agents to negotiate over ontological correspondences. In this dialogue, agents
can not only make assert moves to assert beliefs, they also can object to a belief by
providing an attack and accept or reject beliefs. In the ArguGRID [108] project, Web
service, agents and argumentation technique have been combined to support decision
making and negotiations inside Virtual Organizations. ArgSCIFF [109] is a project
that aims to make Web service reasoning more visible to potential users by using
dialogues for service interaction. It extends the kind of request-response interaction
among Web services and makes agents justify the interaction outputs. The difference
between their work and our approach is that we utilize the PCC paradigm to the
dialogue to enable agents to automatically check formal proofs that provided by the
service provider. An automate negotiation approach has been presented among agents
in an open environment in [102]. In this work, protocols are expressed in terms of
a shared ontology. Based on the shared ontology, agents can learn to tune strategies
based on existing algorithms. We extend their work by introducing dialogue games into
the scenario.
In our previous work, we have represented some properties (e.g. truthful bidding
is a dominant strategy in a Vickrey auction) in the theorem prover Coq [9]. We have
implemented the Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [80] paradigm to certify the desirable
properties of online auction services, which are written in OWL-S. PCC is a paradigm
that enables a computer system to automatically ensure that a computer code provided
by a foreign agent is safe for installation and execution. We use the interactive theorem
prover Coq because it has been developed for more than twenty years [34] and is
widely used for formal proof development in a variety of contexts related to software
and hardware correctness and safety. Coq has been used to develop and certify a
compiler [61], and a fully computer-checked proof of the Four Colour Theorem has
been created by [41]. In the work of [8], we have formalized an auction service using
OWL-S, then we translate this representation into a program that is written in Coq.
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The semantics of these expressions is preserved in this transaction. Then, we use proof
tactics to prove desirable properties of these expressions within the theorem prover
Coq.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a dialogue game to enable buyer agents to automati-
cally query an auctioneer before deciding whether or not to join an online auction. We
have formally described this inquiry dialogue model by defining the rules of locutions
and commitments. The auctioneer and the buyer share a common knowledge enabling
them to communicate and make sense of each other’s arguments. But they also have
private knowledge. For example, the questions related to properties of interest to the
buyer are not known to the auctioneer until they have been revealed through the dia-
logue. The buyer has a ranking function over the questions in the form of a preference
level, which is used to drive the dialogue forward. A scoring function over possible
answers in line with predefined expectations is used to decide whether to join or not
an auction.
A noticeable feature of our dialogue game is that it uses formal proofs as arguments.
Thus, it combines formal evidence with informal evidence in an interaction. We have
implemented our dialogue framework from within JADE wherein we have integrated the
Coq theorem prover in the Proof-Carrying Code paradigm enabling an agent to check
whether a proof of a given auction desirable property is correct or not. Experimental
results have demonstrated the feasibility as well as the validity of our approach.
In this chapter, we have presented a dialogue game to enable buyer agents to check
some desirable properties of a service specification. To extends the model of dialogue
games, we will consider the communication during a service and the composition of
different services in a transaction. We will simulate virtual markets that are composed
of various services using dialogue games in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
Dialogue Driven Semantic Web
Service Composition
6.1 Introduction
Future agent-mediated e-commerce systems will deal with software agents involved in
financial transactions and in legally-binding contracts on behalf of humans in the In-
ternet. To provide a good foundation for automating the use of web services, Semantic
Web Services are proposed to automate service discovery, interoperation, and compo-
sition. OWL-S [69] is an ontology language to describe the semantics of Web services,
which can be used to define the capabilities, requirements and internal structures of
Web services. The OWL-S provides a good approach to describe the process of an
online auction service. Nevertheless, using OWL-S alone to implement online auction
services is not sufficient for us, although we can provide a specification for auction
services. In a sequential auction system, such as the English auction, the auctioneer
should report current highest bid to every bidder at the beginning of each round and
then bidders can make bids based on the current highest bid and their own strategy.
The bidding process of an English auction requires frequent information exchange. The
OWL-S model provides a way to describe what is carried out in a service and OWL-S
WSDL grounding provides methods to implement an atomic process that is described in
the service’s process model. This grounding is not sufficient to implement the request-
response communication approach in an English auction for example. Thus, we have
introduced the idea of information-seeking dialogues to our implementation of online
auction systems.
After introducing a dialogue into an inner service, we take another step forward to
expand the dialogue to dynamically compose Semantic Web Services. In the example of
the Semantic Web online book store service Congo.com1, a fictitious B2C site is written
in OWL-S. In this example, the process of selecting books, collecting buyer information,
collecting payment and delivering books are clearly described. Although this service
1http://www.ai.sri.com/daml/services/owl-s/1.2/examples.html
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can be successfully implemented as a good example of a semantic web service, it can be
improved to achieve more complex functionality. For example, we can enable the book
seller to persuade a buyer to enter another book selling service or to buy additional
books related to an already purchased book. These kinds of communications need some
form of dialogues, which are beyond the exchange of static data.
The specification of e-commerce systems is a crucial research issue in the devel-
opment of distributed applications on the Internet [39]. In this chapter, we present a
machine understandable description of an online trading system which includes the ser-
vices of auction, payment and delivery. Then, we introduce dialogues to Semantic Web
Services so that the interactivity among participants of an agent mediated e-commerce
system can be improved and the dynamic composition of Semantic Web Services can
happen. To achieve this aim, we formalize Semantic Web Services and dialogues as au-
tomata that describing the interactions among participant agents. To realize the goal
of service composition, we have defined Composite Dialogue Service Automata (CDSA)
to synthesize services into a global automaton. Finally, we compose an auction service
with online payment and delivery services to validate our approach.
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.2, we set up an online trading sce-
nario and give a general discussion on how Semantic Web Services and dialogue games
can support it. Then, we briefly describe the Semantic Web Service and agent dialogue
framework. Formal dialogue model is introduced in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4, we will
describe the proposed automata approach, which combines the techniques described
in Section 6.2. Examples that implement our automata are described in Section 6.5.
Related work is presented in Section 6.6 and summary is given in Section 6.7.
6.2 Background
6.2.1 The scenario: Auction, Payment, and Delivery
In our scenario, Brad is a student who wants to buy some books which are related to his
major through online auction site. One traditional solution for this situation is that he
can visit the online auction web site eBay and search for the books that he preferred.
After one book is found, he joins in an auction to bid for it. If Brad succeeds in one
auction, he can discuss with the seller about the delivery issue and decide the terms of
payment. Brad should repeat all of the above steps for each of the remaining books.
Another solution is that Brad delegates this task to his agent, and then this agent
completes this task automatically. To realize the second solution, the online auction
system should be published in a way to be understood by the agent. This requires
a semantically rich language to support the understanding. The buyer agent should
be able to reason on the rules of an auction and make sure that he will not lose
unnecessarily money by participating into the auction. Another issue to this solution
76
is that the system should enable communication among buyer agents and seller agents.
For example, the buyer agent can tell the seller agent which delivery company he wants
to choose or the seller agent can recommend and persuade the buyer agent to buy
related books, and then invoke another auction process.
The second solution combines the advantages of Semantic Web Services and dia-
logue games. A Semantic Web service provides a way to express machine understand-
able services and dialogue games enable service consumer to communicate with service
provider so that the buyer agents can make decisions based on the result of communi-
cation. The dialogue communication is a collaborative business activity rather than a
formatted client-server interaction.
6.2.2 Service Description
OWL-S has been designed as an ontology language to make Web service descriptions
computer-interpretable. Thus, we rely on OWL-S to implement the Web service and
service automata in this chapter. To describe a Semantic Web Service, the domain
ontology of a service should be developed in the first stage. The domain ontology de-
scribes the semantics of terms representing an area of knowledge and give explicit mean-
ing to the information. For example, we have defined classes Agent, PaymentMethod,
DeliveryCompany as the following declaration.
<owl:Class rdf:ID="Agent"/>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="DeliveryCompany">
<owl:oneOf rdf:parseType="Collection">
<DeliveryCompany rdf:ID="EMS"/>
<DeliveryCompany rdf:ID="FedEx"/>
</owl:oneOf>
</owl:Class>
<owl:Class rdf:ID="PaymentMethod">
<owl:oneOf rdf:parseType="Collection">
<PaymentMethod rdf:ID="Alipay">
<PaymentMethod rdf:ID="CreditCard">
</owl:oneOf>
</owl:Class>
Then OWL-S ontology will be used to describe the trading mechanism. As the
trading mechanism has been treated as Web service, the IOPEs (i.e., inputs, outputs,
preconditions and results) should be defined explicitly. In the service of Payment, the
inputs are Account and PaymentMethod while the output is Gift. We define Gift
as benefits for a specific payment type. In the service of Delivery, the inputs are an
account of an agent, products, delivery company and address, and the output is an
announcement. The following declarations display a segment of the inputs and outputs
of the service Payment.
<process:hasInput>
<process:Input rdf:ID="PayMethod">
<process:parameterType rdf:datatype="&xsd;anyURI"
>http://www.owl-ontologies.com/PaymentOntology.owl#PaymentMethod</process:parameterType>
</process:Input>
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</process:hasInput>
<process:hasOutput>
<process:Output rdf:ID="PaymentGift">
<process:parameterType rdf:datatype="&xsd;anyURI"
>http://www.owl-ontologies.com/PaymentOntology.owl#Gift</process:parameterType>
</process:Output>
</process:hasOutput>
In OWL-S, the term inCondition is used to express the binding between inputs
variables and the particular result variables. In the service of Payment, we would like
to express that if an agent chooses to use Alipay as the payment method, then this
agent will get a gift. This result can be expressed by SWRL as following.
<process:inCondition>
<expr:SWRL-Condition rdf:ID="PaymentAli">
<expr:expressionObject>
<rdf:List>
<rdf:first>
<rdf:Description>
<rdf:type rdf:resource="&swrl;ClassAtom"/>
<swrl:argument1 rdf:resource="#Alipay"/>
<swrl:classPredicate rdf:resource="#PaymentMethod"/>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:first>
<rdf:rest rdf:resource="&rdf;nil"/>
</rdf:List>
</expr:expressionObject>
</expr:SWRL-Condition>
</process:inCondition>
<process:hasEffect>
<expr:SWRL-Expression rdf:ID="effect">
<expr:expressionObject>
<rdf:List>
<rdf:first>
<rdf:Description>
<rdf:type rdf:resource="&swrl;SameIndividualAtom"/>
<swrl:argument2 rdf:resource="#gift"/>
<swrl:argument1 rdf:resource="#PaymentGift"/>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:first>
<rdf:rest rdf:resource="&rdf;nil"/>
</rdf:List>
</expr:expressionObject>
</expr:SWRL-Expression>
<process:hasEffect>
Two sorts of process can be invoked in an OWL-S process model. One is atomic
process, which corresponds to a one-step request-response message exchange. Both
of the services Payment and Delivery are described as atomic process. The other
is composite process, which corresponds to multi-step actions that linked together by
control flows and data flows. The control flows are described using constructs such
as sequence, split, if-then-else and iterate etc. Data flow describes how information is
transferred from one step of a process to another. The example of a composite process
can be found in Section 5.2.1.
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6.2.3 Agent Dialogue Framework
Formal dialogue games have been applied in multi-agent systems to enable software
agents to interact with each other. Walton and Krabbe [112] propose a typology of pri-
mary dialogue types to model dialogues. In their typology, six primary dialogue types
are categorized: information-seeking dialogues, inquiry dialogues, persuasion dialogues,
negotiation dialogues, deliberation dialogues and eristic dialogues. McBurrney and Par-
sons [71] identify five dialogue game rules in formal dialogue games. These rules include
Commencement Rules, Locutions, Combination Rules, Commitments and Termination
Rules.
Three-level hierarchical formalism is presented in [71] for agent dialogues. The low-
est level is the topic layer which displays the subject of a dialogue. The middle level is
the dialogue layer which is the combination of six primary types of dialogues. The top
level is the control layer which represents the selection and transition of specific dia-
logue types. The control layer is composed of two components: Atomic Dialogue-Types,
which include five dialogue types except eristic dialogue in the taxonomy of Walton and
Krabbe; and Control Dialogues that have their discussion subjects of other dialogues.
Then five dialogue combinations are defined to represent the combination of atomic
or control dialogues. The five dialogue combinations are: iteration, sequencing, paral-
lelization, embedding and testing. Given the above definitions, McBurrney and Parsons
define an Agent Dialogue Framework (ADF) as a five-tuple (A,L,
∏
Atom,
∏
Control,
∏
),
where:
• A is a set of agents.
• L is a logical language for representation of discussion topics.
• ∏Atom is a set of atomic dialogue-types.
• ∏Control is a set of Control dialogues.
• ∏ is the closure of ∏Atom ∪∏Control under the combination rules.
6.3 Formal Dialogue Model
In our scenario, two types of dialogue are considered: information-seeking dialogue and
persuasion dialogue. In an information-seeking dialogue, we assume that there are one
information requester and at least one information responder. While in a persuasion
dialogue, we assume that there are two participants.
6.3.1 Locutions in the Dialogue Framework
We define ∆ as the representation of atomic dialogue types, and t as the topic of a
dialogue. Seven locutions are defined to control the dialogue, assuming δ ∈ ∆ :
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• begin(δ, t). It makes possible to start a dialogue with type δ on the topic of t.
• agree(δ, t). It is used to accept the request to start a dialogue whose type is δ
and topic is t.
• disagree(δ, t). It is used to reject the request to start a dialogue whose type is
δ and topic is t.
• return control(). It is used to propose a request to jump from one basic type
dialogue to a control dialogue.
• agree return control(). This accepts to return a control dialogue.
• disagree return control(). This rejects to return a control dialogue.
• close(). It is used to close a dialogue.
Let Φ be the set of variables used to express the statements uttered by agents. Assume
that φ ∈ Φ. Three additional locutions are used in the information-seeking dialogue.
• propose(φ). It proposes a statement φ.
• offer(φ). It gives a response φ to a proposition.
• pass(). It gives an empty statement as a response.
Four extra locutions are defined in the persuasion dialogue.
• assert(φ). It gives an assertion of statement φ.
• accept(φ). It is used to accept an assertion.
• argue(φ). It gives an explanation of φ.
• reject(φ). Reject a statement φ.
6.3.2 Commitment Rules
The dialogue assumes that the commitments uttered by all participants are recorded
in a commitment store (CS). The following table 6.1 shows the changes of the CS for
each locution, where p represents the speaker in a move. Note that other locutions that
are not contained in the table will not lead to the updating of the commitment store.
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Table 6.1: Commitment rules
begin(δ, t) CS(p) = CS(p) ∪ {t}
agree(δ, t) CS(p) = CS(p) ∪ {t}
propose(φ) CS(p) = CS(p) ∪ {φ}
offer(φ) CS(p) = CS(p) ∪ {φ}
assert(φ) CS(p) = CS(p) ∪ {φ}
accept(φ) CS(p) = CS(p) ∪ {φ}
argue(φ) CS(p) = CS(p) ∪ {φ}
6.3.3 Dialogue Rules
The protocol for an information seeking dialogue is described in Figure 6.1. Each node
in this graph is a locution, and the outgoing arcs from one node describe the possible
following moves. The nodes with gray background represent a requester while the nodes
with white background represent a responder. We also assume that all the responders
should give responses to the requester in one round of the dialogue so that the requester
can make another iteration.
Figure 6.1: Rules for an information seeking dialogue (grey nodes are for the auctioneer,
white nodes for the buyer)
Figure 6.2 shows the protocol for a persuasion dialogue in our model. In this graph,
one participant represented by nodes with gray background tries to persuade the other
participant to accept his assertions. When a dialogue is not in the control layer, the lo-
cutions return control(), agree return control() and disagree return control()
can be uttered in anytime. Another two moves agree return control() and dis-
agree return control() must follow by the locution return control() control. Note
that our dialogue model supports for embedded dialogues, which means that we can in-
sert one dialogue into another. We will not discuss embedded dialogues in this chapter,
because the topic of this chapter focuses on service generation.
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Figure 6.2: Rules for a persuasion dialogue (grey nodes are for the auctioneer, white
nodes for the buyer)
6.4 Dialogue Service Automata
Service automata are used to solve services discovery and composition in a context-
aware system [118], to perform planning for Web services composition [83] and to
describe global behavior of services composition [35]. To improve the interactivity of
Semantic Web Services, we define a Semantic Web Service as an automaton by applying
the following agent dialogue framework (ADF).
Definition 14. Given an agent dialogue framework (ADF), an Dialogue Service Au-
tomata is defined by a tuple: 〈A,∑, Q, δ, I, F 〉 , where:
• A is an Agent Dialogue Framework (ADF).
• ∑ = ∏∪P is the union of dialogues and inner operations of one service. ∏
represents the closure of
∏
Atom ∪
∏
Control under the combination rules defined
in the ADF, P represents the inner operations of the service.
• Q is the finite set of states of the automata (Q 6= ∅).
• δ is the transition function, that is, Q× Σ→ Q.
• I is the initial state of a service and I ∈ Q.
• F is a finite set of final states and F ⊆ Q.
In an ADF,
∑
is composed of two components. One is the dialogue among service
providers and service consumers. For example, an auctioneer asks for new bids in a
round of an English Auction. The other is the inner operation in one service. For
example, after finding the winner of an auction, the service provider updates the value
of last payment. The transition function δ associates current state q ∈ Q with current
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action a ∈∑ and set δ(q, a) ⊆ Q to next state. There may exist multiple initial states
and final states in this automaton. The initial state I represents the precondition of
a service, while the final state F represents the postcondition of a service. The imple-
mentation of a DSA is shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Implementation of DSA
Require: An Agent Dialogue Framework ADF.
Ensure: The postcondition of one service is satisfied.
1: The DSA starts when the precondition of one service is satisfied.
2: while The final state of one service is not reached do
3: while Need information exchange among consumers and providers do
4: Start a dialogue d until the termination of this dialogue.
5: Perform the transition δ(qi, d) to translate the system from current state qi to
next state qi+1.
6: end while
7: if An inner action a is operated then
8: Perform the transition δ(qi, a) to reach next state qi+1.
9: end if
10: end while
Composite services provide higher value than individual services and can be pre-
dominant in the business world [70]. In order to synthesize two Semantic Web Ser-
vices, we propose Composite Dialogue Service Automata (CDSA). We use the compos-
ite operator ⊗ to represent the composition of two Semantic Web Services. Given
automata 〈AS1,∑S1, QS1, δS1, IS1, FS1〉 corresponding to Service S1 and automata
〈AS2,∑S2, QS2, δS2, IS2, FS2〉 corresponding to Service S2. S1 and S2 can be com-
posite if
• FS1 ∩ IS2 6= ∅
• ∀a ∈ FS1∩IS2, a ∈ K(IS2), where K(IS2) represents the Initial State of S2 which
is denoted by K predicates.
Definition 15. Given a specific Agent Dialogue Framework (ADF), a composition
Service S of S1⊗ S2 is defined as tuple 〈AS ,∑S , QS , δS , IS , FS〉, where:
• AS is an Agent Dialogue Framework (ADF).
• ∑S = ∏S1 ∪∏S2 ∪ PS1 ∪ PS2.
• QS = QS1 ⊗QS2 = {< u, v > |u ∈ QS1 ∧ v ∈ QS2}.
• δS : QS ×∑S → QS.
• IS = {< u, v > | u ∈ IS1 ∧ v ∈ IS2}.
• FS = {< u, v > | u ∈ FS1 ∧ v ∈ FS2}.
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6.5 Example of Dialogue Service Automata
We illustrate our model with dialogue occurrence among one auctioneer and two bid-
ders in an English auction house. The auctioneer persuades the winner to choose a
recommended payment approach and delivery company. In this example, the infor-
mation seeking dialogue is used in the process of the English auction service. Two
persuasion dialogues are used to compose the services: combine the English auction
with a payment service, and combine the payment service with a delivery service. The
dialogue model is implemented in the agent platform JADE [12]. The auctioneer is
represented as A, while the two bidders are represented as B1 and B2.
(1) A: begin(information seeking,English Auction)
(2) B1: agree(information seeking,English Auction)
(3) B2: agree(information seeking,English Auction)
(4) A: propose(hasPrice(Book,15))
(5) B1: offer(18)
(6) B2: offer(20)
(7) A: propose(hasPrice(Book,20))
(8) B1: offer(22)
(9) B2: pass()
(10) A: propose(Winner(B1), Payment(22))
(11) A: close()
The information seeking dialogue for an English auction is closed. Then the auctioneer persuades the
winner to use the recommend payment approach.
(12) A: begin(persuasion, Payment Method)
(13) B1: agree(persuasion, Payment Method)
(14) A: assert(PaymentMethod(Alipay))
The auctioneer suggests the buyer to use Alipay to pay for the item.
(15) B1: argue(PaymentMethod(DebitCard))
The buyer would like to pay by a debit card.
(16) A: argue(inCondition(PaymentMethod(Alipay)),hasEffect(PaymentGift(gift)))
The auctioneer argues that if the buyer pays use Alipay, then this buyer will get a gift.
(17) B1: accept(PaymentMethod(Alipay))
B1 submits his payment information to the service.
(18) A: close()
The auctioneer closes the persuasion dialogue.
(19) A: begin(persuasion, Delivery Company)
(20) B1: agree(persuasion, Delivery Company)
(21) A: assert(DeliveryCompany(EMS))
(22) B1: accept(DeliveryCompany(EMS))
A invokes the EMS delivery service.
(23) A: close()
A closes the second persuasion dialogue.
6.6 Related Work
In [119], a framework called TAGA has been used to simulate an automated trading
in dynamic markets. TAGA uses Semantic Web languages (RDF and OWL) to specify
and publish underlying common ontologies and as a content language within the FIPA
ACL messages. This framework extends the FIPA protocols to support open market
auction services. However, the specification of auction services in this chapter does
not describe the explicit process and rules of different auctions. For example, the rule
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that a bidder cannot bid a lower price than the current bid in an English auction is
not described. In [103], a common shared negotiation ontology has been used to help
agents negotiate with each other. They provide a possible application of this approach
to simulate online auction competition. The simulation is not a real implementation
but they just illustrate the approach using negotiation ontology. In [96], they have in-
tegrated Semantic Web technologies into agent architecture to represent the knowledge
and behavior of agents in a semantic manner. Although, their work is mainly about
distributed knowledge management, the proposed approach can help us build an agent
mediated and to automatically process online auction services. In [39], the authors
have proposed a hybrid solution that uses OWL, SWRL rules, and a Java program to
dynamically monitor and simulate a temporal evolution of social commitments. The
shortage of this approach is that the action and time slice is fixed binding. In our work,
we aim to build a system that is dynamically changing over time. The work of [85]
has presented an inquiry dialogue and illustrated how agents negotiate in a scenario
of ontological correspondences. The dialogue model provided in this paper inspired us
to design the dialogue game that used in this chapter. In the work of [59], an agent
architecture that integrates Semantic Web technologies and multi-agent systems has
been proposed for developers to build knowledge management systems using software
agents. They have implemented their system in JADE and utilized ACL to enable
the communication. We extend their work by introducing difference types of dialogue
games to achieve interaction among agents. A policy and contract extended agent
model has been specified in [65]. In this model both systems and agents can be defined
dynamically by means of policies. In [117], a policy driven model has been proposed
to control the behaviours of agents according to high-level business requirements. In
this model, ontology language is used to describe the business requirements, policies
and the negotiation protocol. The difference is that our work focuses on the problem
of Semantic Web Services composition.
6.7 Summary
The main advantage of a dialogue driven Semantic Web Service is that the message
passing between the service provider (the auctioneer) and the consumer (the buyer) is
dynamic. This means the consumer can challenge the provider while the provider can
persuade the consumer to enter another service and consumers can ask questions or
seek information from the service provider. The dialogue service automata approach
can be used not only to describe the inner status of a specific service but also to
describe services composition. The approach to deal with data flow within a process
is not clearly defined in OWL-S, while arguments can contain data information for the
next process. For example, a new bid can be passed to the auctioneer by an argument
in the process of an English auction.
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In this chapter, we have defined the dialogue service automata approach to extend
the interactivity of the current Semantic Web Service framework. We have presented
a semantic representation of the auction domain using OWL and a service-oriented
approach for the semantic description of auction processes using OWL-S, which pro-
vides a formal and unified representation for online auction systems. By introducing
semantics in the auction domain and combining the ontology with the Semantic Web
Service technique, we have provided an approach for different software agents to au-
tomatically discover and invoke an online auction. We have presented our dialogue
models that can generate information-seeking and persuasion dialogues. By combining
the Semantic Web Service and dialogue games, dialogue service automata has been
proposed. Finally, we have implemented an online auction service, which are written
in OWL-S, by using JADE according to the dialogue service automata. In future work,
we will illustrate our model by implementation embedded dialogues and introduce more
locutions and rules to support negotiation dialogues.
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Chapter 7
Verification of Combinatorial
Auctions
7.1 Background
Imagine an open society of software agents owned by human beings and engaging into
financial transactions through online auctions. Assuming that such software agents
can understand auction protocols, we are interested in ensuring trust in the auction by
enabling agents to formally verify desirable properties. More specifically, we consider
combinatorial auctions and aim to establish well-known properties such as incentive
compatibility by using the Coq [34] theorem prover, which can be used to generate
machine-verifiable proofs. An auction is incentive compatible iff bidding its true valua-
tion is the optimal strategy for every agent. Our motivation for this work is three-fold:
1. This can be used as a decision support system by enabling a participating agent
to check properties of interest before deciding to join a given auction house or
not.
2. The ability to build up machine-verifiable proofs of well-established properties
of auction mechanisms will increase our confidence in proving previously unseen
protocols.
3. This kind of capability is important in mechanism design wherein one aim to
tailor a protocol with specific properties given the preferences or constraints of
the participants.
There is by now a small but increasing body of literature on verifying or certi-
fying auctions properties [101, 61, 9]. Most of this work is focused on single item
auctions except the recent work reported in [24], which investigates the use of the Is-
abelle/HOL [82] theorem prover for the verification of combinatorial auctions. Com-
binatorial auctions involve combination of items making complex not only the bidding
language but also the allocation and payment procedures. Moreover, for us to formally
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verify a property of a given protocol, we need to specify both the protocol and the prop-
erty. It turns out that Coq uses higher order logic, a logic language that is expressive
enough to specify combinatorial auctions such as the VCG (Vickrey Clarke Groves)
mechanism. Thus, we have specified the VCG protocol within Coq. In our previous
work [7] OWL-S is used as the specification language but was limited to single item
auctions. Note that the VCG protocol cannot be formalized within OWL-S since it
involves quantification over valuation or bidding functions. Our formal specification
of the VCG differs from that of [24] not only on the fact we have used different theo-
rem provers but mainly on the fact we have relied upon set theory to explicitly define
bidding pairs, allocation and payment functions, see Section 7.2 for more details.
We have then developed formal proofs for some incentive properties for the VCG
mechanism. These incentive properties are:
• The payment of each agent is non-negative;
• The utility derived by a truthful agent is non-negative;
• The VCG mechanism is incentive compatible.
Observe that for the Vickrey auction, we have an allocation algorithm, which we have
implemented and certified from within Coq in Chapter 1. In contrast, there is no
known allocation algorithm for the general VCG mechanism since the optimal allocation
problem for combinatorial auctions is NP-hard [104]. Instead, the allocation relies on a
non-constructive existence of an optimal solution argmax. As a consequence, we have
developed 1200 lines of Coq proof for the VCG against 200 lines for the Vickrey.
To sum up, the contributions of this work can be stated as follows:
1. We have fully specified VCG auctions by using set theory to represent bids, allo-
cations, and payments.
2. We have developed machine-verifiable proofs of the fact that the VCG mechanism
is incentive compatible.
3. We have also developed simple and elegant proofs for some basic properties proven
before, see for example [7].
7.1.1 Game Theoretic Properties
Generally speaking a combinatorial auction [29] is composed of a set I of m items to
be sold to n potential buyers. A bid is formulated as a pair (B(x), b(x)) in which
B(x) ⊆ I is a bundle of items and b(x) ∈ Z+ is the price offer for the items in
B. The combinatorial auction problem (CAP) is to find a set X0 ⊆ X such that,
for a given a set of k bids, X = {(B(x1), b(x1)), (B(x2), b(x2)), . . . , (B(xk), b(xk))},
the quantity
∑
x∈X0 b(x) is maximal subject to the constraints expressed as for all
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xi, xj ∈ X0 : B(xi) ∩ B(xj) = ∅ meaning an item can be found in only one accepted
bid. We assume free disposal meaning that items may remain unallocated at the end
of the auction.
As shown in [87], the CAP is NP-hard implying that approximation algorithms
are used to find near-optimal solutions or restrictions are imposed in order to find
tractable instances of the CAP [104] wherein polynomial time algorithms can be found
for a restricted class of combinatorial auctions. A combinatorial auction can be sub-
additive (for all bundles Bi, Bj ⊆ I such that Bi ∩ Bj = ∅, the price offer for Bi ∪ Bj
is less than or equals to the sum of the price offers for Bi and Bj) or super-additive
(for all Bi, Bj ⊆ I such that Bi ∩Bj = ∅, the price offer for Bi ∪Bj is greater than or
equals to the sum of the price offers for Bi and Bj).
Game theory mechanism, see for example [29], is usually used to describe auctions,
thus providing decision procedures that determine the set of winners for the auction
according to some desired objective. An objective may be that the mechanism should
maximize the social welfare, which can be for example the sum of all agents’ utilities
in the auction. Such a mechanism is termed efficient. For open multi-agent systems,
another desirable property for the mechanism designer can be strategyproofness (truth
telling is a dominant strategy for all agents). A mechanism that is strategyproof has a
dominant strategy equilibrium.
A wellknown class of mechanisms that is efficient and strategyproof is the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG), see for example [29]. The VCG mechanism is performed by
finding (i) the allocation that maximizes the social welfare and (ii) a pricing rule allow-
ing each winner to benefit from a discount according to his contribution to the overall
value for the auction. To formalise the VCG mechanism, let us introduce the following
notations:
• X is the set possible allocations
• vi(x) is the true valuation of x ∈ X for bidder i
• bi(x) is the bidding value of x ∈ X for bidder i
• x∗ ∈ argmaxx∈X
∑n
i=1 bi(x) is the optimal allocation for the submitted bids.
• x∗−i ∈ argmaxx∈X
∑n
j 6=i bj(x) is the optimal allocation if agent i were not to bid.
• ui is the utility function for bidder i.
The VCG payment pi for bidder i is defined as
pi = bi(x
∗)−
(∑n
j=1 bj(x
∗)−∑nj=1, j 6=i bj(x∗−i))
=
∑n
j=1, j 6=i bj(x
∗
−i)−
∑n
j=1, j 6=i bj(x
∗),
(7.1)
89
and then, the utility ui for agent i is a quasi-linear function of its valuation vi for the
received bundle and payment pi.
ui(vi, pi) = vi − pi. (7.2)
We illustrate a VCG auction as an example.
Example 7.1.1 (A Combinatorial VCG Auction). Let an auctioneer sells two items
A and B in the Internet. Let three agents (b1, b2 and b3) submit the bids as shown in
Table 7.1, where we assume that all agents are bidding truthfully.
Table 7.1: Bids from the agents for different bundles
A B AB
b1 5 6 8
b2 6 4 9
b3 4 7 10
This yields one value-maximizing allocation x∗, i.e. b2 wins item A with bid 6 and
b3 wins item B with bid 7. Then, the payment of b2 is:
p2(A) = (b1(A) + b3(B))− b3(B) = (5 + 7)− 7 = 5
and the payment of b3:
p3(B) = (b2(A) + b1(B))− b2(A) = (6 + 6)− 6 = 6
Finally, the utilities of b2 and b3 are:
u2 = v2(A)− p2(A) = 6− 5 = 1
and
u3 = v3(B)− p3(B) = 7− 6 = 1.
Let p∗i and pi be the payments for agent i when it bids its true valuation vi and any
number bi respectively. Note pi, p
∗
i are functions of b−i. The strategyproofness of the
mechanism amounts to the following verification:
∀i, ∀vi, ∀bi ui(vi, p∗i (b−i)) ≥ ui(vi, pi(b−i)). (7.3)
In the equation (7.1), the quantity
∑n
j=1, j 6=i bj(x
∗
−i) is called the Clark tax. Another
interesting property of this VCG mechanism is that it is weakly budget balanced [27]
meaning the sum of all payments is greater than or equal to zero. For the VCG prop-
erties (e.g. strategyproof) to hold, the auctioneer must solve n+1 hard combinatorial
optimization problems (the optimal allocation in the presence of all bidders followed
by n optimal allocations with each bidder removed) exactly.
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Single item auctions are a particular case of combinatorial auctions wherein one
item is sold at a time. Common single item auctions are the English, Dutch or Vickrey
auctions, see for example [29]. For the Vickrey auction, the payment for agent i is
defined as:
pi = bi(x
∗)−
(∑n
j=1 bj(x
∗)−∑nj=1, j 6=i bj(x∗−i))
=
∑n
j=1, j 6=i bj(x
∗
−i) = the second highest bid.
(7.4)
7.2 Formalization of VCG
Agent-mediated online auctions are applications wherein data can be processed by
automated reasoning tools. Logic-based languages are useful tools to model and reason
about systems. They allow us to specify behavioral requirements of components of a
system and formulate desirable properties for an individual component or the entire
system.
In general, logic-based languages are chosen to balance their expressivity, complete-
ness and decidability of their underlying logic. For example, the expressivity of first-
order logic includes quantifiers, predicates and functions to objects, which is higher than
the complete and decidable propositional logic. In addition to this, quantification over
functions and predicates included in higher-order logic is more expressive than first-
order logic. First-order logic is complete but undecidable, whereas higher-order logic is
neither complete nor decidable. In our work, we advocate using the Coq language for
the following reasons:
• It is expressive enough so that we can specify combinatorial auctions within it.
• It provides us with a higher order logic therefore not decidable but enabling us
to specify mechanisms such as the VCG involving quantification over functions.
• Formal proofs of desirable properties can be developed from within Coq.
We have formalized the VCG mechanism within Coq and we will describe the formal-
ization of the VCG mechanism in the remaining section.
In the formalization, we use a Coq library List to define the operation of Set.
For example, we have defined functions to implement the operations of union and
intersection, the relation of include. Bidders and items are represented as typed set of
natural numbers Bidder and Item respectively. Prices of items are coded as Price and
are restricted to nonnegative integers in order to facilitate proof development. A bid is
then coded as a couple formed by a set of items and a price for that set of items. To
associate a bid with the corresponding bidder, we have defined a record BiddingRecord
to represent a well-formed bidding data as follows.
(*define a bid record as a triple*)
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Record BiddingRecord :=
mk_bidding_record {
record_bidder : Bidder;
bid_items : ItemSet;
bid_price : Price}.
(*define bidding data as a list of bid records*)
Definition BiddingData : Set :=
(list BiddingRecord).
We can check the legality of a set of bids as follows:
(*define the well-formedness property of the bidding data*)
Definition NoDupItemSetEachBidder
(data : BiddingData) :=
forall (n1 n2 : nat) (r1 r2 : BiddingRecord),
n1 <> n2 ->
nth_error data n1 = Some r1 ->
nth_error data n2 = Some r2 ->
record_bidder r1 = record_bidder r2 ->
~ ItemSetEq (bid_items r1) (bid_items r2).
In addition to legality checks, we can create record of legal bidding data. This is useful
for the allocation, which is defined as a set of legal bid records. We ensure this by
checking the well-formedness of an allocation. More importantly, an allocation should
form a partition of the set of the items in the bidding data. This is a much more
involved procedure wherein we must check that the allocated bundles of items cover
the set of items in the bidding data and that every two allocated bundles are disjoint.
Definition GoodAllocation (alloc : Allocation)
(data : LegalBiddingData) : Prop :=
(forall is,
get_item_set (bidding_data data) = is ->
Cover alloc is) /\
Contain (bidding_data data) alloc.
wherein Cover and Contain are both Fixpoint Coq definitions, which respectively
check whether the bundles in alloc is a cover of the set of items is and that the bundles
in alloc are legal elements of bidding data that are relatively disjoint. Likewise, we
can check and create legal allocation.
Another important definition is that of the maximum handled as follows.
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Parameter max_allocation :
forall (d : LegalBiddingData),
LegalAllocation (d:=d).
Hypothesis max_allocation_sound :
forall (d : LegalBiddingData)
(a : LegalAllocation (d:=d)),
(sum_price (alloc a)) <=
sum_price (alloc (max_allocation d)).
This enables us to state that the maximum allocation problem has a solution argmax
even though we do not have an explicit algorithm to calculate it. In fact, the assurance
for the existence of a solution is sufficient for the proofs we are interested in as can be
seen in Section 7.3 of this chapter.
Then, we have also written some handling functions to perform some useful arith-
metic operations such as sum price, which adds all the prices in a legal allocation or
sum price sub i that calculates the quantity in equation (7.1). The formalization of
equation (7.1) is as follows.
Definition payment (d : LegalBiddingData)
(i : Bidder) : Z :=
sum_price (alloc (max_sub_i d i))
- (sum_price_sub_i (alloc (max_allocation d)) i).
The subtractor of this function represents the maximum allocation without bidder i,
while the minuend is the original maximum allocation which subtracts the bidding
record given by bidder i.
Finally, the winner’s utility is defined as the function of utility, which formalizes
equation (7.2).
Definition utility (d : LegalBiddingData)
(b : Bidder) : Z :=
(sum_price_i (alloc (max_allocation d)) b)
- (payment d b).
7.3 Proof of Desirable Properties
The first property that is established for a VCG auction is non-negative payment.
Theorem 7. In a VCG auction, the payment of a bidder is greater or equal to 0.
The mathematical proof can be represented as:
pi =
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
bj(x
∗
−i)−
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
bj(x
∗) ≥ 0
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The related Coq formalization is as:
Theorem payment_greater_than_or_equal_to_zero :
forall (d : LegalBiddingData) (b : Bidder),
payment d b >= 0.
This theorem states that by given a legal bidding data, the payment of a bidder from
a legal allocation is greater or equal to 0. The proof of this theorem is generated by
unfolding the definition of payment.
Proof. According to the definition of payment, winner’s payment equals to sum price
(alloc (max sub i d b)) - (sum price sub i (alloc (max allocation d)) b), where func-
tion alloc returns legal allocations from different bidding records. By having the
premise that alloc (max sub i d b) is an efficient allocation without Bidder b, which
means (sum price sub i (alloc (max allocation d)) b) <= sum price (alloc (max sub i
d b)), the conclusion can be deduced.
The second property that we will establish is that winner’s utility is non-negative.
Theorem 8. In a VCG auction, the utility derived by a truthful agent is non-negative.
The mathematical proof of is as:
ui(vi, pi) = vi − pi =
n∑
j=1
vj(x
∗)−
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
vj(x
∗
−i) ≥ 0
The related Coq formalization is as:
Theorem utility_ge_zero :
forall (d : LegalBiddingData) (b : Bidder),
utility d b >= 0.
This theorem states that given a legal bidding data, the utility of any truthful bidder
is greater or equal to 0.
Proof. The first step in the proof is to unfold the definition of utility. Then, we
perform some algebraic manipulations on this inequality, by which we get:
sum_price_i (alloc (max_allocation d)) b +
sum_price_sub_i (alloc (max_allocation d)) b
- sum_price (alloc (max_sub_i d b))
>= 0
The above inequality can be expressed as the following inequality:
vi(x
∗) +
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
vj(x
∗)−
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
vj(x
∗
−i) >= 0
Then we combine the first two terms at the left of the inequality using a lemma
sum price combine. By this combination we get the following inequality:
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sum_price (alloc (max_allocation d))
- sum_price (alloc (max_sub_i d b))
>= 0
This inequality is the same as the following:
n∑
i=1
vi(x
∗)−
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
vj(x
∗
−i) >= 0
By applying the hypothesis max allocation sound which states x∗ is the efficient
allocation, the above inequality can be proved directly.
The last property that has been established is incentive compatible, i.e. declaring
their true valuation function vi is a weakly dominant strategy for all players.
Theorem 9. The VCG mechanism is strategy-proof, i.e. incentive compatible.
The mathematical proof of this theorem is as follows. Suppose bidders declare bids
b′1, ..., b′n, and the true valuation of bidder i is vi. Let x∗ = f(vi, b′−i) and x
′′ = f(b′i, b
′
−i).
As x∗ ∈ argmaxx∈X vi(x) +
∑n
j=1;j 6=i b
′
j(x). Thus, for all x ∈ X ,
vi(x
∗) +
n∑
j=1;j 6=i
b′j(x
∗) ≥ vi(x) +
n∑
j=1;j 6=i
b′j(x).
Therefore,
ui(x
∗) = vi(x∗)− pi(x∗) ≥ vi(x′′)− pi(x′′) = ui(x′′).
The related Coq definition of this theorem is as the following formalization.
Theorem strategy_proof :
forall d1 d2 b,
HonestBidding d1 b
-> DiffByBidderPrice b (bidding_data d1)
(bidding_data d2)
-> utility d1 b >=
utility d2 b.
In this theorem, d1 represents the bidding data which are composed of truthful bidding,
while d2 includes the untruthful bidding of agent b. The bidding data of other agents
are the same in both d1 and d2. This theorem states that the utility of truthful bidding
is greater or equal to the utility of untruthful bidding strategy for bidder b.
Proof. The first step is to unfold the definition of utility and payment, which yields
the inequality as below:
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sum_price_i (alloc (max_allocation d1)) b -
(sum_price (alloc (max_sub_i d1 b)) -
sum_price_sub_i (alloc (max_allocation d1)) b)
>=
sum_price_i (alloc (max_allocation d2)) b -
(sum_price (alloc (max_sub_i d2 b)) -
sum_price_sub_i (alloc (max_allocation d2)) b)
The above inequality is the same as the following mathematical notation:
vi(x
∗)− (
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
bj(x
∗
−i)−
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
bj(x
∗)) >= vi(x′′)− (
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
bj(x
′′
−i)−
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
bj(x
′′))
Then we perform some algebraic manipulations followed to simplify the above in-
equality as:
vi(x
∗) +
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
bj(x
∗)−
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
bj(x
∗
−i) >= vi(x
′′) +
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
bj(x
′′)−
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
bj(x
′′
−i)
The corresponding Coq representation is:
sum_price_i (alloc (max_allocation d1)) b +
sum_price_sub_i (alloc (max_allocation d1)) b -
sum_price (alloc (max_sub_i d1 b))
>=
sum_price_i (alloc (max_allocation d2)) b +
sum_price_sub_i (alloc (max_allocation d2)) b -
sum_price (alloc (max_sub_i d2 b))
By applying the lemma sum price combine on the above inequality, we get the
following inequality:
sum_price (alloc (max_allocation d1)) -
sum_price (alloc (max_sub_i d1 b))
>=
sum_price (alloc (max_allocation d2)) -
sum_price (alloc (max_sub_i d2 b))
The corresponding mathematical notation is:
n∑
i=1
vi(x
∗)−
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
bi(x
∗
−i) >=
n∑
i=1
vi(x
′′)−
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
bj(x
′′
−i)
On one hand, the assumed function max sub i returns a legal allocation on a bidding
data, which has the maximum summed prices without bidder b. On the other hand, by
removing agent b from d1 and d2, the remaining agents’ reports are the same in both
d1 and d2. Hence, we get the equation:
sum_price (alloc (max_sub_i d1 b)) = sum_price (alloc (max_sub_i d2 b))
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which means:
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
bi(x
∗
−i) =
n∑
j=1, j 6=i
bj(x
′′
−i)
Hence, we can deduce the following inequality:
sum_price (alloc (max_allocation d1)) -
sum_price (alloc (max_sub_i d1 b))
>=
sum_price (alloc (max_allocation d2)) -
sum_price (alloc (max_sub_i d1 b))
The last step is to prove:
n∑
i=1
vi(x
∗) >=
n∑
i=1
vi(x
′′)
The inequality follows because we assume x∗ is an efficient allocation with respect
to the true profile of valuations in the hypothesis max allocation sound.
7.4 Related Work
Interactive theorem proving is one approach to verify the correctness of an algorithm or
a network protocol meets its specification. It can also be used to verify that a mathe-
matical statement is true. In a theorem prover, such as Coq and Isabelle/HOL [82],
the mathematical content is represented as a machine understandable manner. Users
use tactics to create proof in a man-machine collaborated way and the proof can be
automatically checked by a proof checker. Interactive theorem proving is applied to
prove and verify some pure mathematics theorems. The prime number theorem, which
described the asymptotic distribution of the prime numbers among the positive inte-
gers, was formally proved and verified by using Isabelle/HOL in the work of Avigad
et al. [5]. In [46], John Harrison has formalized a complex-analytic proof of the prime
number theorem in the HOL Light theorem prover by developing necessary analytic ma-
chinery including Cauchy’s integral formula. The first major theorem that was proved
using a computer is the four color theorem [3]. The four color theorem states that any
map in a plane can be colored using four colors in such a way that regions sharing a
common boundary do not share the same color. In [42], a computer-checked proof of
the four color theorem has been constructed in Coq. In the work of [47], HOL Light
theorem prover has been used to formalize the Dirichlet’s theorem, which asserts that
for all pairs of positive integers a and b that are coprime, there are infinitely many
primes of the form a+nd, where n is a non-negative integer. More theorems that have
been formalized using different theorem provers can be found in [113].
Formal reasoning has been applied to theoretical economics, especially in the area
of social choice theory [81] and game theory [24]. In the work of [81], Arrow’s impos-
sibility theorem has been formalized in higher-order logic which provides a valid proof
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of the theorem, while the original standard and textbook proofs of Arrow’s general
impossibility theorem are invalid [88]. In the work of [24], by formalizing and prov-
ing several desirable properties (e.g.,VCG auctions are pairwise disjoint and prices are
non-negative) of a VCG auction in Isabelle, they provides a sound specification of the
mechanism. Both of the above formalizations are represented in higher order logic and
set theory which indicates that mechanical theorem proving is suitable for social choice
theory and game theory.
Formal verification has been used to verify an operating system kernel using Is-
abelle/HOL in [54]. In this work, they not only provide a full specification of the ker-
nel, but also proof for the kernel’s precise behavior. By proving a formal and machine-
checked verification of an operating-system kernel, the behavior of the kernel in every
possible situation can be precisely predicted. In the project of CompCert [61], Coq
has been used to program and prove the correctness of a compiler from Clight (a large
subset of the C programming language) to PowerPC assembly code. This approach
guarantees that the safety properties proved in Clight hold in PowerPC assembly code.
A machine-verified software-defined networking controller has been designed and for-
malized in Coq, which provides a robust guarantee of desirable behaviors [44]. This
prototype is implemented by extracting Coq code into OCaml.
7.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have formalized a VCG auction, and proved some of its incentive
properties by using the interactive theorem prover Coq. Coq is a proof assistant that
is based on higher-order logic and type systems. It has been used to verify famous
pure mathematical theorems, economic theorems and software verification. Our work
provides a machine-verifiable for a mathematical theorem on the VCG combinatorial
auction. Such a formal verification can be used in automated mechanism design for
online auction or Web services.
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Chapter 8
Concluding Remarks
In agent-mediated e-commerce systems, software agents are responsible for selling or
purchasing commodities and services on behalf of their owners. Software agents with
limited computational resources and bounded rationalities must make decisions to opti-
mize their payoffs in a given transaction. In our work, we focus on online auctions since
they have been established as an efficient protocol to do business. Auction mechanisms
are designed to have some desirable properties such as incentive compatibility. The
following requirements must be implemented in agent-mediated e-commerce systems to
enable automated decision-making and services composition.
• Trading protocol such as auction mechanisms should be published in a standard
language which is machine-readable.
• The desirable properties of specific auction mechanisms and formal proofs of these
properties should be described.
• The proofs of desirable properties should be automatically checked by software
agents.
• The interaction protocol implemented in the system should support automated
communication among software agents.
• An online trading may require the composition of different services to achieve its
objective. Thus, an automated communication approach should be provided to
realize service composition.
In order to meet the requirements, we have proposed a certification framework in
Chapter 3, and to enable software agents to automatically check desirable properties
of a specific auction through a formally designed communication protocol, and then
make decisions according to the result of the communication. Furthermore, we extend
the communication mechanism to the area of Semantic Web Service composition and
explore the verification of combinatorial auction mechanisms. In the following, we
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highlight the distinguishable contributions of this thesis by analyzing related work in
existing literature.
Firstly, Chapter 4 exploits that an online trading protocol, such as single item
auctions, can be expressed as web services using Semantic Web Service description
languages (i.e., OWL-S). The specification of an auction provides a machine under-
standable presentation of trading mechanisms. Because of the expressive limitation
of Semantic Web Service languages, we therefore rely on the technique of interactive
theorem proving to construct proofs of properties for a trading mechanism. By trans-
lating the auction specification from OWL-S to an imperative program which is defined
within an interactive theorem prover named Coq, we then apply Hoare Logic to prove
the desirable properties of the original specification. There is some work related to the
translation of service descriptions. Brogi et al. [22] present a translator that translating
OWL-S process description in to Petri nets, so that the tools available for Petri nets
can be used to analyze OWL-S services. Ankolekar et al. [1] describe a mapping from
OWL-S process model into equivalent PROMELA statements that can be evaluated
by a model checker SPIN. Then numerous properties (e.g. safety and liveness proper-
ties) of the OWL-S process model can be verified using SPIN. Feng and Kirchberg [37]
propose an approach which translates an OWL-S process model into process algebra,
and then use a model checker to check the properties of the process. In this thesis, we
have defined the semantics of a subset of OWL-S ontology within the theorem prover
Coq and then provided the proofs of desirable properties.
Secondly, it shows that the Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) paradigm can be imple-
mented to make an auctioneer publish an auction specification and proofs of desirable
properties of the auction, and then enable buyer agents to automatically check the
correctness of these proofs using a proof checker in Section 3.2. PCC paradigm has
been used by Leroy [62] to certify a compiler so that the safety properties proved on the
source code also hold for the compiled code. Love et al. [68] present a framework based
on PCC paradigm to enable consumer to verify security-related properties of hardware
intellectual property. In this thesis, the PCC paradigm has been implemented using
Coq, and then we have integrated PCC paradigm within an inquiry dialogue game
that supports automatically communication between buyer agents and auctioneers in
Chapter 5. Dialogue games have been used in multi-agent systems to support effective
interaction among agents. Black and Hunter [17, 18] propose an inquiry dialogue sys-
tem that not only provides protocols but also a strategy to generate dialogues. Our
inquiry dialogue game is designed to follow the design of Black and Hunter [17, 18]. The
difference is that both formal proofs and informal evidence can be used as arguments
in our inquiry dialogue game. By using dialogue games, buyer agents can make their
decisions about whether or not to participate in an auction, and even determine their
bidding strategies according to the results of the communication.
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Thirdly, dialogue games are extended to support the composition of Semantic Web
Service in Chapter 6. On the one hand, dialogue games have been utilized to resolve
conflicts and manage internal and external influences in multi-agent systems [52]. Dif-
ferent kinds of dialogues are proposed to achieve variety objectives. For instance, in
a persuasion dialogue, participants aim to resolve a difference of opinion. Persuasion
dialogues have been applied in various areas, such as artificial intelligence and law [13]
and human-robot interaction [94]. On the other hand, automated composition of Web
services at the process level is a difficult challenge as the nondeterministic and partially
observable behaviors of component services. Bertoli et al. [16] formalize the automated
process-level composition of services as a planning problem wherein services are repre-
sented as finite state automata. In this thesis, we have introduced dialogue games into
Semantic Web Services and proposed Composite Dialogue Service Automata to synthe-
size services. Dialogue games extend the original client-server communication paradigm
of Semantic Web Services to more complex manners. For example, the service provider
can not only persuade buyer agents to choose its service but also composite services
that fulfill the requirements of buyers by using dialogue games.
Finally, Chapter 7 shows the exploration of formalization and verification desirable
properties of combinatorial auctions. Combinatorial auctions allow bidders bid on
combinations of items in the presence of substitutes and complements. VCG mechanism
is a classical combinatorial auction that satisfies some desirable properties, such as
incentive compatibility. However, the VCG mechanism is computationally intractable.
Hence, we introduce hypothesis to state the property of efficient allocations in a VCG
mechanism. The VCG mechanism is specified within Coq directly, due to OWL-S has
limited expressiveness of service description, which corresponds to its underlying Web
Ontology Language (OWL). We present the proofs of three desirable properties of the
VCG mechanism: the payment is non-negative, the utility of truthful bidder is non-
negative, and incentive compatibility. There is some work related to our approach.
In the work of Tadjouddine and Guerin [100], model checking is used to formalize
and verify properties of a two player Vickrey auction and a quantity restricted multi-
unit auction using the VCG mechanism. Braˆnzei et al. [21] construct a verification
algorithm to verify a mechanism is strategy-proof. The focus of their work is that
the agents are able to efficiently verify the truthfulness of a mechanism. Caminati et
al. [24] use Isabelle to formally specify the combinatorial VCG auction and prove a set
of desirable properties (e.g. VCG allocations are pairwise disjoint). We extend their
work by verifying the incentive compatibility property of VCG mechanisms.
The work in this thesis can be extended in a number of promising directions for
future work.
• Formalization and verification of game theoretic properties. We consider formal-
izing and proving more game theoretic properties of different mechanisms. The
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well-known game theoretic properties include pareto efficiency [116] in which re-
sources are allocated in the most efficient manner, false-name-proof [106, 107]
where no agent has incentive to use fake accounts, Nash equilibrium [110] in
which no single player can gain higher payoff by changing his strategy unilater-
ally, and security properties [20] such as fairness which states that all agents are
treated equally.
• Sound specification and implementation of programs. The specification of ser-
vices in this thesis is expressed in the language of OWL-S. The grounding OWL-
S Services with WSDL or Java can be implemented using the OWL-S API [91].
However, we still face the problem that whether the specification is faithfully
implemented or not. In the work of [24], Isabelle/HOL is used to generate
verified executable code directly from its specification to a functional program-
ming language. This requires the specification written in a constructive logic
manner. Coq also has an extraction mechanism to generate certified programs
to functional programming languages, such as Ocaml, Haskell or Scheme, out of
Coq programs [63]. The faithful implementation of a specification can be studied
to ensure that a program is consistent with its design.
• Consistency checking of specifications. One of the desiderata for specifications is
that a specification should be consistent and should not contradict itself. Specifi-
cations are usually written in different languages. In the work of [92], a tableaux
reasoner is designed to check the consistency of an OWL-DL ontology which is
based on description logic. The consistency checking task of first-order formula is
defined as a satisfiability checking task [19]. However, the satisfiability problem
for first-order logic is undecidable [43], which makes it a hard problem to check
the consistency of a specification. We would like to explore the method to check
the consistency of specifications.
• Interoperable multi-agent systems. In our work, all of the agents are developed
within JADE and a common ontology is shared among them. However, software
agents can be developed using different platforms or languages in an open sys-
tem. Therefore, we should design mechanism to handle the interoperable problem
between heterogeneous software agents.
• Argumentation-based dialogue games. Argumentation can be used in dialogues
to represent the reasonable conclusions by constructing pro and con arguments.
In the original of Dung [36], an abstract argumentation framework has been pro-
posed to formalize relations between arguments, different semantics are defined
to solve the inherent conflicts between statements. Examples to compute argu-
mentation semantics can be found in the work of Liao [64]. In the work of [67], a
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division-based approach has been proposed to cope with the problem of changing
arguments and their attack relations in dynamic argumentation systems. In [66],
the authors have proposed methods to efficiently compute the partial semantics
of argumentation using answer-set programming. We plan to integrate argumen-
tation into dialogue games to support conversations among agents.
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